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I. INTRODUCTION: NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
In Boomer v. Muir,1 a subcontractor on a hydroelectric project 
continued to provide goods and services even though the value of the 
performance far exceeded the contract price. The general contractor, 
who was receiving these goods and services, breached the contract 
even though he was paying less than market price for them.2 
In many states, a supplier in the subcontractor's position has 
among her options the choice of "rescission and restitution."3 That 
means the supplier may rescind the contract and seek, under the label 
of "restitution", payment set at market price (or at her cost)4 for all 
the nonreturnable goods and services provided over the course of the 
project. Under the majority rule, it does not matter whether the mar-
ket price (or cost) is above the contract price5 or even above the value 
of what the defendant has received;6 if after the other party's material 
1. 24 P.2d 570 (C31. Ct. App. 1933). 
2. Id. at 578. 
3. See, e.g., United States v. Zara Contracting, Inc., 146 F.2d 606, 610 (2d Cir. 1944); Paul 
Hardeman, Inc. v. Arkansas Power & Light, 380 F. Supp. 298, 338 (E.D. Ark. 1974); Murdock-
Bryant Constr., Inc. v. Pearson, 703 P.2d 1206, 1217 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Majestic Ttle Co. v. 
Nicholls, 29 N.Y.S. 551, 557 (1936); Allen, Heaton & McDonald v. Castle Farm Amusement Co., 
86 N.E.2d 782, 783 (Ohio 1949); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 373 cmt d (1981). 
4. On this measure, see infra Part VI.E. 
5. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Tripple, 79 A. 703 (1911) (holding that restitutionary 
recovery is not limited by the contract price). 
6. See, e.g., Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509 (Ct. Cl. 1965); United 
States ex rel Susi Contracting Co. v. Zara Contracting Co., 146 F.2d 606, 610~11 (2d Cir. 1944); 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CoNTRAcrs § 347 cmt c (1932). 
The logic of calling such a remedy "restitutionary" has been questioned, on the apparent 
ground that restitution should always be measured by the benefit to the defendant See, e.g., 
Mark Petit, Jr., Private Advantage and Public Power: Reexamining the Expectation and Reliance 
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breach the partially-performing supplier chooses to rescind, the court 
will award her the price (or cost) of what she has supplied.7 This was 
in fact the rule applied in the Muir case. 
Andrew Kull strongly takes issue with this majority approach·.s 
He argues that if contracting parties cannot be returned to their pre-
contract, status quo positions, restitutio,n should be denied. In his 
view, restitution should be available only under the limited circum-
stances where it was pe~tted under the old common law rules; 
under those rules, the contract price would effectively cap any res~itu­
tionary award.9 Professor Kull believes that when restitution requires 
the defendant to pay an amount in excess of the contract price, the 
result is economically unsound as well as unjust. 
In particular, Professor Kull fears that the majority rule-
allowing full restitutionary awards to a plaintiff who has provided an 
extensive amount of nonreturnable goods or services at less than mar-
ket prices-would have the following effects. He argues it would (1) 
Interests in Contract Damages, 38 HAsrnlos LJ. '417 (1987). For our response, see the discussion 
infra part VIII. · 
7. The same appears to be true in cases of mutual mistake, where neither party is at fault. 
Thus, in Vickery v. Ritchie, the building owner and the contractor were each deceived by a third. 
party; the owner signed a contract that stated the price to be $10,000 less than the price con-
tained in the contract signed by the contractor. 88 N.E. 835 (Mass. 1909). Even in such a case, 
the court did not think that "the right" of the plaintiff should "depend in any degree upon the 
profit or loss to the owner." Id. at 837, The plaintiff was awarded the "fair value of his labor and 
materials," id., despite a finding that this exceeded the increase in the value of the owner's real 
estate, id. at 837. (We are indebted to Paul Shupack here.). 
8. Andrew Kull, Restitution As iz Remedy for Breach of Contract, 61 S. CAL. L. Rev. 1465 
(1994). For others who have argued that the contract price should cap a restitution award, see, 
e.g., Henry Mather, Restitution As a Remedy for Breach of Contract: The Case of the Partially 
Performing Seller, 92 YALE LJ. 14, 48 (1982); Palmer, The Contract Price As a Limit on Restitu-
tion for Defendant's Breach, 20 OHIO ST. LJ. 264 (1959); Jo'seph Perillo, Restitution in the Second 
Restatement of Contracts, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 37, 42 (1981). 
Professor Kull's position has much in common with that of Douglas Laycock. See Doum.As 
LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES! CASES AND MATERIALS (1985) and the accompany-
ing TEACHERS' GumE. (Note that we have Professor Laycock's permission to quote from the 
Teachers' Guide.). 
9. In Professor Kull's view, rescission and restitution should be limited along the lines 
indicated by a much earlier stage of the common law. Kull, supra note 8, at 1468, 1S13-16. 
Professor Kull does not insist on exact adherence to the terms of the old common law. Id. at 
1513-16. He argues that the remedy should be available only when (speaking approximately), it 
largely appears that (1) defendant's behavior is "tantamount to a repudiation," id. at 1514-15; (2) 
plaintiff has not yet invested a significant amount in performance, id. at 1516; and (3) the goods 
are returnable in specie, or the transaction can be otherwise fully undone, id. at 1515-16. 
In such cases, restitution is highly unlikely to result in a monetary award in excess of the 
contract price. 
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create inefficient incentives for the parties by (a) encouraging the sup-
plier to maneuver the other party into a breach10 and (b) encouraging 
that other party to overspend in order to avoid breach-like behavior.11 
He also argues that it would (2) engage courts in the potentially 
expensive administrative task of going outside the four comers of the 
contract to value the plaintiff's performance.12 Professor Kull further 
argues that such awards in excess of the contract price (3) do not rep-
resent a plausible default rule to which the parties themselves would 
have agreed ex ante.13 Additionally, he contends that such awards are 
( 4) unjustified by the law of restitution itself because the defendant 
purchaser is not unjustly enriched if he is required to pay the contract 
price for what he has received.14 · 
II. SUMMARY OF OUR PROPOSAL 
Professor Kull's article provides a wonderful education in the law, 
history, morality, and economics of certain contract problems. It is 
well thought out and stimulating. 
However, underlying Professor Kull's argument is the assumption 
that because of the substantial difference between the contract price 
and the market price of the goods and services supplied (or the differ-
ence between their contract price and their cost to the supplier), the 
contracts he discusses are "losing contracts." Viewed as spot, short-
term contracts and measured by the money only, such contracts may 
indeed be losing contracts; if so, the consequences ~at Professor Kull 
predicts in terms of the effect of a restitutionary rule on the parties' 
incentives and behavior may well be realistic. In contrast, we propose 
what we believe to be a more plausible assumption, that many ostensi-
bly losing contracts are in fact beneficial to both parties; then we 
explore what implications would follow from this assumption and pro-
pose a different rule. 
A. BEYOND THE FACE OF THE CONTRACT 
A pricing shortfall on the face of a contract does not mean the 
supplier has a losing position; parties often do not price contracts 
solely by reference to the short-term and monetizable advantages they 
10. Id. at 1502. 
11. Id. at 1501-02. 
12. Id. at 1501. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 1483-84. 
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provide.15 For example, we will suggest (plausibly, we think) that the 
subcontractor in the Boomer v. Muir case did not calculate his com-
pensation at little more than half of its market value by some horren-
dous mistake.16 Business people are generally more rational and well-
informed. Those who make such mist~es do not stay in business 
long. 
Undertaking to perform and performing a contract at less than 
market price or less than cost does not necessarily mean that a sup-
plier is mistaken, ignorant, mad, or self-sacrificing. Nor does continu-
ing to perform a contract on such terms necessarily mean that the 
supplier is acting merely to avoid an action for breach of contract by 
the other party. It may be more likely that she affirmatively desires to 
complete the contract. Her behavior may indicate that something else 
compensates her for the underpriced performance. Similarly, when 
the defendant misbehaves and instead of suing, the supplier-plaintiff 
continues to perform despite the fact that her costs are drastically 
increased by the defendanf s misconduct, we can plausibly assume she 
has some rational motive for doing so. She may fear that she will 
herself be sued for breach; but in many 'contexts it will be more likely 
that she expects to receive some intangible benefit, in addition to the 
price, from ·the completion of the contract. Such a supplier,s continu-
ing, below-cost performance may be a way of bribing the other party 
to stay in the contract. 
B. SEPARATING OUT THE NON-LOSING CONTRACTS: VIRTUES OF A 
BIFURCATED APPROACH 
Critique~ of the majority 'rule are us1;1ally premised on the 
assumption that the contracts at issue are "losers,, for the supplying 
15. Of course, this is fundamentally an empirical issue. This Comment will suggest possible 
scenarios of ostensibly losing contracts that are not true "losers"-and thus possible ways for a 
court to structure its factual investigations. 
16. In Muir, the court notes that if the plaintiff had completed the contract, he would have 
received $20,000. Pursuant to his restitution claim, however, he received a judgment for 
$250,000. 24 P .2d 570, 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933). 
The facts of the case are somewhat obscure. Professor Laycock suggests that the following 
might have been the facts: that "[t]he contract price was $333,000"; that "Boomer had received 
$313,000 in progress payments, and would have been entitled to another $20,000 if he finished 
the job" and had spent $571,000 "building as much as he did, not counting any waste that was his 
own fault" and "lt would have cost another $29,000 to finish the job." LAYCOCK, supra note 8, at 
523. The larger a disi:repancy, the more likely it resulted from the supplier's deliberate decision 
rather than his mistake. 
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party;17 we will show that those critiques can do no more than per-
suade courts to limit their restitutionary awards in cases of truly losing 
contracts. Where, by contrast, intangible, non-price benefits are 
expected, so that the supplier would not actually lose from contract 
completion, we argue that it is desirable for courts to give suppliers the 
option of receiving a restitutionary award even if it exceeds the con-
tract price. 
Though our approach µright involve courts in separating losing 
from non-losing contracts,18 our way of handling non-losing contracts 
has four sets of virtues. First, it creates incentives for the parties to act 
efficiently by (a) discouraging the recipient of the below-cost goods 
from exploiting the sq.pplier's desire for contract completion by engag-
ing in opportunistic and wasteful behavior, (b) discouraging the recipi-
ent of the below-cost goods from inefficiently breaching the contract, 
and perhaps most importantly, (c) encouraging efficient contracts to 
form by, inter alia, allowing the parties to take socially-beneficial 
advantage of asymmetries in information. 
Second, such an award structure may also have desirable implica-
tions for administrative costs, giving courts a means by which to indi-
rectly measure opportunity cost, reliance, and expectation. In some 
cases this approach will be more reliable and easier to administer than 
the usual measures.19 Third, the restitutionary remedy may accurately 
reflect what the parties would have viewed to be in their mutual self-
interest had they focused their attention on the question ex ante. 
Fourth, we show that in such contexts, allowing restitutionary awards 
in excess of the contract price is justified by the law of restitution 
itself. 
Where a plaintiff's losses from a contract are ostensible rather 
than real, courts that adopt a full restitutionary measure would not be 
making the errors Professor Kull depicts. Rather, in such cases the 
majority rule simply requires the defendant to give the plaintiff the 
best equivalent20 to precisely what the defendant agreed to pay ini-
tially: contract price and contract completion. 
17. In comparison, see Kull, supra note 8. 
18. On this administrative cost issue, see infra Part VII.E. 
19. Professor Kull recognizes that courts have sometimes used a restitutionary measure as 
a proxy for reliance. See Kull, supra note 8, at 1492. . 
20. In most cases contracts involve services and goods that are not unique. In these cases 
specific performance of the contract is not available. See infra note 51. 
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Admittedly, in most contract cases, obtaining the contract price is 
a supplier's ostensible end. But in cases like Muir, the courts may be 
recognizing that some parties value the means to that end as much as 
the end itself.21 Further, this value can be quite visible to even the 
most hard-headed Holmesian among us.22 
c. OUR PROPOSED RULE 
The reader may find it useful if we summarize the approach we 
think should apply. We tentatively suggest the following as a desira-
ble refinement and restatement of the majority rule: 
WHERE 
THEN 
(a) (1) as part of an ongoing contract a supplier provides 
goods or services at a below-market price; 
OR 
(2) in entering into a contract a supplier agrees to 
provide goods or services at a below-market price; 
(b) because the supplier expects that contract completion will 
yield non-price benefits sufficient to make that contract 
profitable; AND 
(c) the recipient of these goods and services accepts them with 
the knowledge that they are being provided because the · 
supplier expects such non-price benefits; AND 
( d) the recipient materially breaches the contract; 
( e) the supplier should be given the option to rescind the 
contract; 
AND 
(f) receive a restitutionary award compensating her for any 
nonreturnable goods and services she provided, 
(g) at an amount either equal to her costs, or, if the defendant 
can prove that market price was lower than the supplier's 
costs, at market price.23 
21. See Edwin Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect, 131 U. PA. L. R:ev. 933 
(1983). 
22. That is, we show that a broad restitution rule is justifiable without needing to rest on 
the notion that contracts imply a moral obligation to perform. Regardless of whether one 
believes, like Justice Holmes, that performing a contract and paying damages for its breach are 
equally appropriate, one can support imposing on a defendant an obligation to pay more than 
the contract price. Ordinary expectation and reliance damages can do as much. 
23. This rule might be usefully amended to recognize another possible reason for 
deliberately providing below-market goods and services, namely, a party's belief that the 
contract required her to make such provision. Where that belief is correct and the receiving 
party does not breach, then of course the supplier has no relief. However, that belief can be 
erroneous. Galligan shows us there can be substantial confusion in the administration of 
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The Boomer v. Muir rule (adopted by the majority of the courts) 
is actually broader than our proposed rule, for it provides 
restitutionary awards-uncapped by the contract price-even in cases 
which are truly losing contracts and where other of our conditions are 
not satisfied. This breadth has various possible explanations as we 
discuss below,24 including a desire to simplify judicial proceedings and 
save administrative costs. 
D. CATEGORIES OF RELIEF 
Arguably, we discuss cases that might be resolved by expectation-
based or reliance-based compensation. That is because we explain 
apparently losing contracts, in which a party provides goods or serv-
ices substantially below market price or costs, by the parties' expecta-
tions for non-price benefits (from existence or completion of the 
contracts), or by the parties' reliance on the contract for such bene-
fits.25 In fact, however, the courts are unlikely to award the plaintiffs 
in the cases we discuss expectation and reliance compensation because 
of the degree of proof which the courts would demand for such non-
price benefits. Some recent cases have granted somewhat speculative 
expectation damages, however, and if this new trend continues and 
construction contracts, often forcing suppliers to give more than they are legally required to. 
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Extra Work in Construction Cases: Restitution, Relationship, and 
Revision, 63 Tur.. L. REv. 799, 800 (1989). Where that happens, allowing restitution to the 
mistaken party may be proper under another doctrine of unjust enrichment law: that is, 
restitution may operate to recover goods or monies that were paid under a mistaken belief that 
one was legally obligated to provide them, see, e.g., PETER BIRKS, AN INrRonucnoN To THE 
LAW oF REsrmmoN 149-53 (1985) (liability mistakes by plaintiffs) (English law), particularly 
when the person receiving the goods or monies is aware of the belief that motivated the transfer. 
See id. ch. VIII (free acceptance by defendants); cf. Galligan, supra, at 803 (courts typically 
award restitution in construction cases where there has been exploitable ambiguity as to a 
performing party's obligations). 
This "liability error" approach applies to losing as well as non-losing contracts, and as such 
is outside the scope of this Comment. Nevertheless, if we were to restate our proposed rule with 
explicit mention of this wrinkle, it would look roughly like this (with the changes italicized): 
(a) where in entering or performing a contract (b) a supplier provides goods or services 
at a below-market price (c) either [i] in the expectation of receiving non-price benefits 
from contract completion, or [ii] in the erroneous belief she is legally required to provide 
those goods or services, and (d) the recipient of these goods and services accepts them 
with knowledge that they are motivated by the supplier's expectations (as in [i]) or by 
the supplier's belief in her liability (as in [ii]), then {e) when the recipient breaches the 
contract, the supplier should be entiUed to receive an award compensating her for any 
nonreturnable goods and services she provided, either at her costs, or, if the defendant 
can prove market price would be lower than plaintiff's costs, at market price. 
24. See infra part IX. 
25. That is, we will show the benefits that the majority approach provides in the context of 
ostensibly losing, but actually mutually-beneficial, contractual relationships. 
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widens, such expectation damages might subsume many situations in 
which courts have granted restitutionary damages in the past. 
Nevertheless, if the traditional requirements of certainty and 
specification of the scope of risk do not work perfectly in the context 
of cases such as those we discuss, the best practical response may not 
be to erode contract rules that 4ave great usefulness in the ordinary 
context. It may be preferable to embrace a special remedy (restitu-
tion) for a special case. As F~ller and_Perdue noted long ago, those 
situations which unite loss to plaintiff and gain to defendant have spe-
cial claim to rectification.26 
E. OUTLINE OF COMMENT 
This Comment is structured as follows. We first survey the possi-
ble benefits that might flow from ostensibly losing contracts.27 We 
next discuss fairness to the defendant, particularly whether the award 
of restitutionary remedy must depend on whether the defendant had 
notice of the plaintiff's expectation of nonmonetary benefits28 and the 
importance of there being an actual contract in addition to a transfer 
of benefits to the defendant.29 We then turn to the issue of primary 
resource allocation30 and compare with our approach a rule that 
would cap plaintiff's remedy at the contract price;31 in this regard we 
pay particular attention to discouraging both opportunism and ineffi-
cient breach and encouraging efficient use of informational asymme-
tries. We follow this comparison with a discussion of the 
administrative costs.32 Penultimately, we deal with the relationship 
between expectation, reliance, and restitutionary damages. We con-
clude that even though the courts may be expanding expectation dam-
ages, they are not yet covering all restitutionary cases under that 
26. See L.L. Fuller & William R Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: I, 
46 YALE LJ. 52, 56 (1936) (citing ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 120-23 (Martin Oswald 
trans., 1962)). For a Lockean rationale justifying roughly the same normative claim, see Wendy 
J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 18 VA. 
L. REv. 149, 208-10 (1992). 
27. See infra part ill. 
28. See infra part IV. 
29. See infra part V. 
30. The "primary" or "allocative" cost locution refers to economic impacts out in the 
world, as opposed to "administrative" costs.· Cf. Guwo CALABRESI, CoSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A 
LEGAL AND EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS 21, 27' 28 (1970) (opposing primary and secondary real-world 
costs with "tertiary" administrative costs). 
31. See infra part VI. We recognize that other proposals exist as well, but do not specifi-
cally discuss each. 
32. See infra part VII. 
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rubric33 and that giving restitutionary awards in the Muir context is 
consistent with underlying doctrinal patterns and policies.34 The issue 
of whether restitution should be awarded under an expanded rubric of 
expectations is left for ariother day.35 
ID. THE INTANGIBLE BENEFITS OF SEEMINGLY LOSING 
CONTRACTS 
A. INTANGIBLE BENEFITS IN EXCHANGE FOR DISCOUNTED PRICE 
A large part of Professor Kull's argument against the restitution-
ary remedy in cases like Muir is that the parties should get "what they 
bargained for" and no more.36 We agree with the principle. We disa-
gree with its application, however. While Professor Kull considers the 
price to be the only thing for which the supplier bargained, we suggest 
that Muir and similar decisions reflect that the supplier had factored 
into her bargain something _more than just the price. 
Thus, a contract that promises a supplier lower monetary consid-
eration than the market price is not necessarily a "losing contract." In 
fact, it is more likely that such a contract will carry with it nonmone-
tized expectations. A supplier may value the contractual relationship 
for the sake of the benefits (in addition to receipt of the contract 
price) that she believes will flow from the existence and completion of 
the contract.37 The following will discuss some of the non-price bene-
fits that might compensate for the monetary discount a supplier may 
offer. 
1. Benefits from Third Parties: Contract Existence and Completion 
A contract relationship may enhance the supplier's reputation. If 
so, contract completion38 may provide a supplier of goods or services 
an opportunity of gaining future benefits from third parties. 
For example, consider an experienced but unknown architect who 
leaves her staff position at a large architectural firm to start her own 
33. See infra part VIII. 
34. See infra part IX. 
35. See infra part IX.B. 
36. See Kull, supra note 8, at 1478-84. 
37. Discussion of that general point will occur in the following sections. See infra part 
ID.A.1-ID.B. 
38. As for skill training, contract completion will be important only in those cases when the 
relevant skill is that of completion-for example, the opportunity to take a large building project 
through full construction. 
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business. Her prior projects probably bear the firm's name rather 
than her own. She might well be willing to offer her services at less 
than market price in order to establish an independent reputation in 
the market by having a building fully credited to her. If the architect 
is rational, and we assume that she is, this intangible value will equal 
or exceed any difference between the discount price in the contract 
and the market price.39 That difference, or shortfall, can itself be used 
as a minimum measure of the contract's intangible value to the 
plaintiff. 
2. Benefits from the Other Party: Reciprocity 
Alternatively, or in addition, a supplier may offer a discount to 
the other party in the hope of receiving future benefits from that other 
party. Such expectations generally arise in ongoing relationships and 
are based on the strong inclination of people to expect and offer recip-
rocal treatment.40 That is why one practice of salesmanship is: be first 
to give something to a potential buyer-that person will feel obligated 
to reciprocate and buy. A gift or the offer of a price discount can 
create moral, psychological, and social pressures to reciprocate. 
For example, assume that a buyer of goods and services knows41 
that the supplying party is willing to accept an under-market price 
now in the expectation of being rehired later. If the buyer neverthe-
less materially breaches this contract, that may be tantamount to repu-
diation42 of the understanding regarding possible reciprocity in the 
future-and entitle the other party to the value of the expected recip-
rocal benefits. 
Thus, it is possible that the subcontrac~or in the Muir case agreed 
to provide or continued to provide services at less than the market 
price in order to obtain work from the contractor in the future.43 The 
contractor was engaged in a large project: building a dam at a cost of 
39. For example, if she has a 40% expectation of receiving $100,000 in new business from 
successful completion of a given building, she may be willing to accept $40,000 less for providing 
services toward that building than she might otherwise demand. 
40. For a fascinating discussion of the subject, see LAWRENCE C. BECKER, RECIPROCITY 73, 
354, 346-51, 383 (1986) (discussing self esteem; strategy of tit for tat; and family). 
41. On the role of notice, see infra Part IV. 
42. Compare Kull's discussion of what kind of breach (repudiatory, et cetera) should be 
required as prerequisite to plaintiff's obtaining rescission. Kull, supra note 8, at 1495, 1514-15. 
43. In Muir, the court does not mention this explanation, instead focusing on the possibility 
that the defendant's conduct rendered the plaintiff's performance unprofitable. Boomer v. 
Muir, 24 P .2d 570, 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933). 
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over $7 million (about $1 billion in today's currency).44 This would be 
the kind of project in which a subcontractor might expect future 
assignments. In such a case the subcontractor would not view the con-
tract as a losing one but for a breach by the defendant that makes 
clear that future assignments will not be forthcoming. 
To be sure, the expectation of reciprocity is not rational in spot, 
short-term contracts. Reciprocity is practiced and expected, however, 
among parties in long-term relationships, among members of a profes-
sion or trade,45 and among groups that are dependent on each other 
for their business, such as specialized subcontractors (electricians, 
plasterers, and painters) and contractors in the building business.46 
There are some empirical data to suggest that U.S. businessmen 
in some regions will perform their contracts because they value honor 
and reputation over money no matter how much they might lose.47 
Such evidence may be interpreted to contradict our assumptions, for it 
may indicate that far more losing contracts exist than our argument 
assumes. That is, conceivably some business persons supply below-
cost goods and services out of an erroneous belief they are legally 
obligated to do so and not because they expect non-price benefits out 
of reciprocity. However, these cases may be amenable to restitution 
under another doctrine, namely, benefits conferred under mistake of 
law.48 
This evidence, moreover, may strengthen rather than undercut 
our argument. Honor may be efficient,49 and reciprocity (one of the 
44. Id. at 571. 
45. For example, even though real estate brokers compete for customers they need each 
other to efficiently identify potential buyers or sellers beyond their own client base. They often 
refer customers to each other in the expectation of reciprocity and rarely fail to reciprocate. 
Medical doctors and lawyers act in a similar way. 
46. The bargaining position of the parties may change depending on the extent of labor 
shortage. Long-term, each group member recognizes the dependence on the good graces of the 
other. Even if the business of these actors is national or international, reciprocity in particular 
localities must be maintained to reduce the cost of moving personnel and gaining community 
acceptance. 
47. RoBER.T C. ELLICKSON, ORDER. WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETI1.E DISPUTES 
154, 189-90 (1991) (discussing the work of Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Busi-
ness: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55, 63 (1963)). Businessmen in the midwest 
believed that you should stick by your words "in almost all situations." Id. 
48. See BIRKS, supra note 23, at 140-53 (English law). 
49. Honor and reputation are valuable in contracts within ongoing relationships because if 
everyone adheres to the code of honor the costs of monitoring and enforcement are reduced for 
all parties. See ELLICKSON, supra note 47, at 189-91. 
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forms of non-price benefit) is a form of honor. Reciprocity and keep-
ing one's word "at all costs" may go together. 
Thus, a serious error made by one party is likely to lead to an 
adjustment either in the particular contract or through future arrange-
ments by reciprocity. Group pressure to perform at any cost is com-
pensated by long-term relationships which enable the parties to adjust 
exchange discrepancies, thus suggesting reciprocity will be a norm 
among these same··business people.50 
In short, in some types of contracts reciprocity may constitute an 
intangible, but acknowledged and highly valued benefit. Because in 
many of these cases specific performance is not available,51 a restitu-
tionary remedy is appropriately awarded. 
3. Benefits from the Contract Period Coverage 
Contract duration itself can constitute a non-price benefit for 
which the parties bargained. Thus, contract completion can have 
value wheri the contract covers a period over which compensation is 
expected to fluctuate, as with a contract to supply seasonal goods or 
services. A supplier of seasonal services will often agree to compensa-
tion below the market price in high season provided that the contract 
extends throughout the low season as well. Such a supplier will typi-
cally demand compensation at a price that is close .to the weighted 
average of both seasons' market prices. In this case it is obvious that 
the completion ~f the contract has for the supplier a special value that 
affected her consent to the level of compensation. Therefore, if the 
other party breaches the contract at the point when high seasonal 
prices begin to drop, the supplier should be entitled to compensation 
for what she has already supplied-and not just at the contract price, 
50. Though we know of no research explicitly examining whether the "stick by your word" 
norm and the "reciprocity"· norm are likely to appear together, the fact that both are likely 
components of "honor" suggest that they do. Reciprocity is at least as common a norm as is the 
other. Cf. id. at 154 (reciprocity is" 'a norm that is one of the world's commonest'" (quoting 
GEORGE c. HOMANS, THE HUMAN GROUP 284 (1950))). 
51. With few unique exceptions, courts d~ny specific performance of service contracts and 
refuse to impose a duty to perform on the p~rty that undertook to provide the service. See E. 
Au.AN FARNSWOR1H, CoNTRAcrs § 12.4 (2d.ed. 1990). For reasons of equal treatment, courts 
will also deny specific performance to the other party to the contract In addition, courts will not 
grant specific performance when the costs of monitoring the remedy are high. Id. § 12.7. In the 
Boomer v. Muir case, specific performance would require two warring parties to cooperate and 
work together and require the court to supervise and maintain the relationship. It is doubtful 
whether that relationship could be maintained, and even if it could, the judicial enforcement 
costs would probably be high. 
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but rather at the higher market rate (or her costs).s2 Had she known 
the contract would last only for the high season, she would have 
charged a high-season price. 
A similar point can be made about cases in which market-price 
fluctuations cannot be predicted in advance. In any case where a sup-
plier continues to provide services at a contract price after the market 
prices have risen above that price, and the other party later breaches 
the contract when market prices have fallen below the contract price, 
the supplier should be entitled to compensation for materials and 
services already delivered at the higher market price she would have 
received had there been no contract in effect.s3 Admittedly, in such 
cases the supplier may not have expected to be providing goods or 
services at a below-market price (distinguishing the supplier from the 
provider under a seasonal contract), but she did bargain with the 
expectation of accepting risk for the whole contract period. Sans the 
whole period, the benefits she bargained for will not be forthcoming.s4 
B. NON-PRICE BENEFITS FROM CONTRACT COMPLETION 
1. Benefits of Contract Completion 
Intangible benefits can explain not only why a supplier agrees to 
a discounted contract price but also why a supplier, who enters a con-
tract at the full price, continues to perform the contract at a loss 
caused by the breach of the other party, rather than repudiate the 
contract. For example, in the Muir case, the contractor breached the 
express terms of the contract from day one, failing to transfer control 
over the necessary power equipment to the subcontractor and failing 
to provide the materials that the subcontractor needed in order to per-
form the work.ss The jury also found that, notwithstanding these 
breaches, the subcontractor did not leave the work, but continued to 
make both himself and his crew available; at the same time he pro-
tested the contractor's breach of the contract.s6 
52. See Wellston Coal Co. v. Franklin Paper Co., 48 N.E. 888, 889 (Ohio 1897). 
53. See Oark v. Manchester, 51 N.H. 594, 595-96 (1872). 
• 54. Thus, it may not have been only the threat of the other party's suit that encouraged her 
to continue her supply activity after the market price rose; she may think that in the long run she 
won't be hurt by the shqrt-term shortfall. · 
55. Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570, 572-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933). 
56. Id. at 574. 
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Arguably, the plaintiff simply threw good money after bad, per-
forming irrationally or by error. A better explanation is that he con-
tinued to perform after the defendant's breach, at excess cost to 
himself, because the plaintiff expected such non-price benefits in the 
form of future work57 from the contractor in reciprocity. 
The defendant's contract termination eliminated a valuable com-
ponent of the plaintiff's benefits. To make the plaintiff whole, the 
defendant was required to pay the full value of the plaintiff's serv-
ices-sans the contract relationship and the future expected benefits it 
provided. This value can be roughly measured by the difference 
between the price the plaintiff was to receive under the contract, and 
his performance costs or the market price of the goods and services. 
2. Exceptions and Apparent Exceptions 
We readily concede that not all discounts are offered with the 
expectation of intangible non-price benefits. For example, a supplier 
may offer a deep discount because he made an error in pricing. In 
such a case, if the other party breaches the contract it would be unjust 
to the breaching party to award the supplier more than the contract 
price.58 Such a result would undermine an important policy of 
57. During the contract period, the parties renegotiated and adjusted important terms of 
the contract: The subcontractor's price was increased, the amounts to be withheld until the com· 
pletion of his work were paid to him, and the subcontractor agreed to meet periodic targets for 
pouring cement. Id. at 572. Although in Professor Kull's story "[t]he general contractor failed to 
deliver some item of materials, the subcontractor left the job unfinished, and the parties went to 
court, each accusing the other of substantial breach. The jury decided this issue, which could 
have gone either way, in favor of the subcontractor." Kull, supra note 8, at 1471. We need not 
speculate whether the case' could have gone either way. The fact is that the subcontractor won-
the contractor was held to have breached, and the subcontractor was justified in leaving the job 
unfinished. Such behavior seem5 to be based on the value which the subcontractor attributed to 
the existence of the contract. 
58. Courts have noted that a wide disparity between an offered price and a market price 
can indicate a unilateral mistake as to the terms of the agreement of which an offeree should be 
aware. See In re Jay's 'Ihlcking Co., 26 B.R. 73, 76 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982). Alternatively, an 
error may be due to a computational or technical error for which it would be inequitable to hold 
a party to the stated price. See S.T.S. 'Ihmsp. Serv. v. Volvo White 'Ihlck Corp., 766 F.2d 1089, 
1093 (7th Cir. 1984). In either case, the contract may be voidable. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OP 
CoNTRAcrs §§ 152-54 (1981); see Rushlight Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. City of Portland, 219 
P.2d 732 (Ore. 1950). Despite these possibilities, as the disparity grows, the likelihood that a 
supplier made an error in judging economic conditions or costs decreases. 
A potential counter-example is Aydin Corp. v. United States. There the plaintiff sued the 
government after receiving information under the Freedom of Information Act that showed that 
its bid was 40% less than the only other bid. The plaintiff sought rescission and restitution under 
a quantum valebant theory. The court denied this relief because the plaintiff's error was simply 
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encouraging people to collect the necessary information to avoid such 
mistakes. 
We suspect, however, that if market prices are available during 
contract negotiations, a real error is likely to involve a small differen-
tial. In such cases the parties will not have much to fight about; they 
may settle the difference. 
As the difference between the market price and contract price 
increases, however, the probability that the supplier made an error 
diminishes. The market price offers a strong signal calling for the sup-
plier's attention, and in cases of extreme divergence between market 
and contract price, it is far more likely that the supplier expected non-
price benefits from the contract than that she made an error in offer-
ing such a low price. We argue that most business people act in a 
rational manner and would offer deep discounts only if they expected 
other intangible benefits from the contracts. 
Against our supposition, it might be argued that some subcon-
tractors offer a deep discount because they could not find a buyer for 
their services or goods. In theory, if a supplier agrees to the low price 
because he has no choice, and the contractor drove a hard bargain, we 
agree that the subcontractor should be awarded the contract price 
rather than the higher market price. Yet in such cases, this is likely to 
be a distinction without a difference. 
If the supplier offered discounted prices because of low demand 
for its services or goods, the market price would have reflected this 
low demand, and the contract price would have represented no dis-
count at all. Similarly, a supplier may agree to a low contract price 
because the quality of the goods or services is low. In such a case the 
market price for such low quality offerings will match the contract 
price, and there would be no real discount because these two prices 
will coincide. Or perhaps, the supplier offered an apparent discount 
because of personal deficiencies, such as a bad reputation or a crimi-
nal record; in this case, again, the market price for the offering will 
coincide with the contract price. Thus, such instances are not counter-
examples to our argument. 
an error in judgment and uot a mistake of which the defendant should have been aware. 669 
F.2d 681, 686 (Ct. a. 1982). 
However, a 40% discrepancy such as that seen in Aydin might be explainable not on the 
ground of a conspiracy among the bidders, perhaps suspected by the court but not proved. 
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IV. FAIRNESS TO THE DEFENDANT: NOTICE OF 
EXPECTED INTANGIBLE BENEFITS 
' . . 
Many cases reflect the concern that compensating the plaintiff for 
loss of non-price benefits may be unfair to the other (breaching) 
paity.59 Arguably, that other party may not be aware of the plaintifrs 
expectations and hopes for intangible benefits. Because contract par-
ties provide each other with guarantees against risks it is often seen as 
wrong to hold a party liable for losses against which it did not-agree to 
provide guarantees, particularly losses of uncertain magnitude. 
We do not argue with this. principle; but it is not the issue here. 
The disagreement is about the facts: Is the other party usually una-
ware of the non-price benefits tire supplier expects to receive? 
We believe that in many situations involving expected non-price 
benefits the other party has, indeed, received express or implied 
notice of the expectations; and in these situations restitutionary reme-
dies are appropriate.60 
Proof qf such notice may reside in explicit statements. Consider a 
supplier who says to the other party: "I am offering you my services at 
an extraorclin,arily low price because I hope that if my services are 
satisfactory you will recommend me to other customers." Or a sup-
plier who says to the other party: "I will supply you goods and services 
at a deep discount because I hope that, if you are satisfied, you will 
employ me on your next project." 
Or proof may ~e out of context. There are cases in which the 
very circumstances serve as notice of a party's expectations. For 
example, construction· contr~cts lend themselves to expectations of 
reciprocity.61 During the perforinance of these contracts each party 
59. Under the rule announced in Hadley v. Baxendale courts limit damages in a contract 
action to those damages that are reasonably foreseeable by the breaching party. 156 Eng. Rep. 
145 (Ex. 1854); see Paul Hardeman, Inc. v. Arkansas Power & Light, 380 F. Supp. 298, 319 (E.D. 
Ark. 1974) (quoting Benedict I. Lubell, Unilateral Palpable and Impalpable Mistake in Construc-
tion Contracts, 16 Mnm. L. REv. 137 (1931)). 
60. When the exl>ei:tations of the stipplier are not legally binding and enforceable, (where, 
for example, the expectations are for future assignments) the other party is not required to 
honor these expectations and need not reciprocate. However, the other party must deal with the 
supplier in good faith. If it is aware of the expectations; it should not be permitted to take 
advantage of the discounted price and then breach the contract in violation of the expectations. 
See infra part V. 
61. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 61 VA. 
L. REv. 1089. (1981); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations 
Under Classica~ Neoclassical & Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854 (1978). 
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may, at some point, give more than it is required to give under the 
contract. That party can rationally expect to be rewarded, either dur-
ing the contract period or later: I will do more than we agreed upon 
now, but "you owe me one" (or more). 
The Muir case, on which Professor Kull focuses, offers an exam-
ple of such notice by implication. In that case, the subcontractor/sup-
plier continued to perform at a losing rate caused by the contractor's 
misbehavior. The contractor had notice of these additional supplies.62 
The contractor could not have avoided taking notice because the sub-
contractor complained bitterly about the excess cost and about the 
breaches.63 The court could have viewed the express complaints of 
the subcontractor and his continued performance at a cost far higher 
than the contract price as evidence of notice to the contractor that the 
subcontractor expected some intangible benefi~s from the continua-
tion of the contract. Indeed, Thomas Galligan tells us that in con-
struction contracts it is common for one party to provide more 
supplies and services than it has undertaken contractually and that 
such excess supplies are usually compensated for by the other party.64 
Impliedly, benefits that the contractor receives may also constitute 
notice of the subcontractor's expected non-price benefits. In many 
cases, it would be irrational for the contractor to view the supply of 
additional goods as "free lunch." 
When the defendant 'breaches such a contract he signals that he 
will not fulfill the plaintiff's expectations. If the defendant materially 
breaches the contract after receiving the bene~t of the bargain (or 
more) under the contract, the defendant must compensate the plaintiff 
not only by the monetized contract terms but also for the failed and 
known expectations that depended on the continuation of the 
contract.65 
62. For cases where the courts awarded special damages even though the special circum-
stances were communicated to the breaching party after the contract was made, see J.N. Adams, 
Hadley v. Baxendale and the Contract/Tort Dichotomy, 8 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 147 (1979). Lia-
bility in these cases might be grounded on intentional tort: the courts' finding that the breaching 
party had capacity to perform and made a conscious choice not to perform the contract 
Paul Shupack has intringuingly suggested that intentional tort might provide an alternative 
explanation or grounding for many cases in which restitution was awarded in excess of contract 
price. 
63. Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570, 573-74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933). 
64. Galligan, supra note 23, at 800, 811 (1989) (stating that "[t]he perfectly discrete transac-
tion does not exist"). 
65. If a contract becomes a losing contract after it has taken effeet because of external 
circumstances, for example, because prices have changed, the losing party will be bound to the 
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V. MERE EXPECTATIONS STANDING ALONE ARE NOT A 
BASIS FOR REsTITUTION 
We concluded in. the prior section that a breaching party should 
be liable for the other party's expectations only if the breaching party 
had express or implied notice of the expectations. Our rule also 
assumes that another condition will be met if the defendant is to be 
made liable for expectations that do not independently constitute 
legal obligations: A related contract exists among the parties. 
A. EXPECTATIONS THAT Do NoT AMoUNT TO LEGAL 
OBLIGATIONS 
We believe that there is a rich variety of circumstances which fall 
between enforceable contracts and nonenforceable social and business 
understandings. Even if these understandings could be translated into 
binding contractual agreements the costs of -the translation could be 
too high because these understandings may be too vague and contin-
gent. More importantly, many contractually binding deals are accom-
panied by "soft" promises ("I'll do my best, but will not obligate 
myself contractually") and acceptance of such promises. For example, 
the other party may acknowledge a supplier's expectations involved in 
offering goods at a discount but may not be willing to promise the 
supplier additional orders for the goods in the future. 
No doubt, the courts are aware of these "shadow" understandings 
and of their social utility.66 Therefore, courts will not enforce these 
understandings when the promising party fulfills its contractual obli-
gations; so long as it does not breach the contract, it is not bound to 
meet the understandings and "soft" expectations at all,67 and even if it 
breaches the contract, it is not bound to meet the understandings if it 
has received no benefits on account of them. Once it has breached 
the contract, however, a breaching party who has knowingly received 
benefits because of the expectations, should be required to return the 
contract. In fact, the losing party usually demands and receives compensation for the potential 
losses. 
66. We have all heard of "bargaining in the shadow of the law"; here we are talking about 
"making law in the shadow of bargaius." 
67. The breaching party coula argue that the supplier's expectations were not worth much, 
in light of his disappointing performance. For a discussion of this point, see supra Part II. 
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benefits or compensate the supplier for the loss of these expecta-
tions68 up to the amount it cost the supplier to provide the benefits or 
their market value; the courts will use restitution to accomplish this. 
In Part ID we dealt with two types of expectations: those expecta-
tions that a supplier hopes to receive from third persons who are not 
parties to the contract, such as enhanced reputation, and those expec-
tations that a supplier hopes to receive from the other party to the 
contract, such as reciprocity. In the first case, the other party to the 
contract has less control over the satisfaction of these expectations, 
although it might contribute to the reputation of the other party. In 
the second case, it has more control over the satisfaction of these 
expectations, yet such obligations may tum out to be a too speculative 
and unsuitable subject for a binding contract. In both cases the 
breaching party is not legally obligated to provide these additional 
benefits, and, had the party not breached the contract, the supplier 
would have no claim against it either for enhanced reputation or for 
reciprocity. Is our rule nonetheless too expansive? 
B. THE EXISTENCE OF RELATED CONJ;RACT AMONG THE p ARTIES 
The reader might be concerned that we are proposing that resti-
tutionary remedies be allowed for breach of expectations whenever 
the other party had notice of these expectations. This is not our posi-
tion. As Peter Birks writes of the British law on the subject, although 
mistake is a classic ground on which restitution can be granted, mere 
mistaken expectations standing alone are not the proper premise of a 
suit for restitution.69 Expectations in the contractual context, coupled 
with the other party's free and knowing acceptance of the goods the 
expectations have brought forth, may be another matter. 
Tort law makes a similar distinction. , For example, many states 
have strong limits on the ability of negligence plaintiffs to recover for 
68. For reasons explored at Part VIII, the measure of these benefits should be the sup-
plier's costs or the fair market value (whichever is less) and not the increase in the defendant's 
asset value produced by the supplier's efforts. 
69. He writes: 
Suppose ••• I do months of work preparing plans for your building in the confident 
belief that you will give me the contract to clear the site and carry out the development 
These are predictions and, when I find myself disappointed, mispredictions. I may call 
them mistakes, but they are a kind of mistake which does not count If you stood by 
without warning me that my hopes were vain, I may be able to make out a claim based 
on free acceptance, but not on mistake. 
BIRKS, supra note 23, at 147 (footnotes omitted); see id. at 153 (making the same point about 
payments made in expectation of reciprocity). ' 
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emotional7° or economic71 harms when they stand alone. Plaintiffs 
who cannot sue for these same items, lest an explosion of suits and 
liability result,.can,·sue on these items when their suit is coupled With a 
breach of a more easily provable and less-omnipresent injury. Thus, 
when there is physical harm, a plaintiff can also collect for emotional 
harm (such as pain and suffering) and economic harm (such as lost 
wages). The provable injury opens the door to proof of these other, 
"parasitic" damages.72 
There is no intrinsic reason why the law should deny recovery to 
purely economic and emotional harms.?3 The reasons have to do with 
our "imperfect technology of justice"74 and the concern that any acci-
dent is capable of causing an almost infinite domino effect of emo-
tional and :financial harms. The requirement of a claimant's physical 
damage largely obviates· this expansive tendency. 
In our area, there may be many reasons for denying restitutionary 
remedies to suppliers for transfers made on the mistaken expectation 
of non-price benefits. But two are these: difficulty of proof (for exam-
ple, which items were pure gifts?),75 and the desirability of encourag-
ing people to be clear about the duties they hope to impose on others. 
These two considerations do not have strong force in our case. The 
presence of a contract gives us something definite on which to anchor 
a commercial, nondonative expectation. And the difficulty of specify-
ing all details in a contract weighs against the desire to encourage 
extreme specificity. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR EFFICIENCY 
To recap briefly, we have argued that if both parties recognize 
that a supplier's willingness to contract at a discounted price (or her 
70. See Cauman v. George Washington Univ., 630 A.2d 1104, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
71. See Louisiana ex rel Guste v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1027 {5th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 828 {8th 
Cir. 1983). 
72. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 56·57 
(5th ed. 1984). 
73. In fact, some states have moved toward allowing their recovery. See infra part VI. 
Compare State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952} with Thing v. La 
Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 {Cal. 1989). 
74. The phrase is from BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LmERAL STATE 20 
(1980). 
15. See, e.g., BIRKS, supra note 23, at 153. · 
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willingness to supply goods and services at a below-market price )76 is 
motivated by her expecting a net gain because of non-price benefits 
resulting from contract completion, then she should not lose by this 
discount if the other party breaches. Reliance and expectation dam-
ages may in some cases compensate her for the loss; where the value 
of the damages cannot be determined with sufficient specificity, how-
ever, an award of reliance or expectation damages would not fully 
compensate her for the expected non-price benefits, or even the dis-
count that they motivated. Restitutionary remedies may be necessary 
to avoid inefficient and wasteful behavior in contexts where non-price 
benefits make a contract worthwhile for the supplier. 
(This is a far different proposition from that advanced by Profes-
sor Kull. He is concerned that a rule like ours would lead to ineffi-
cient and wasteful behavior.77 To the contrary, the following will 
show that only our rule avoids the most likely inefficiencies and 
waste.) 
We argue that awarding restitution in excess of the· contract price 
in such cases creates efficient incentives in at least three ways. 
Since the recipient realizes the supplier has a strong desire for 
contract completion, in the absence of a rule like ours the recipient 
may try to wring ever more price or service concessions out of the 
supplier. Any expense that is incurred to extract mere transfer pay-
ments is wasteful,78 and strategic maneuvering can be expensive. Fur-
ther, a recipient who receives goods at a below-cost price may be 
likely to use them wastefully. Thus, restitutionary awards will discour-
age the recipient of the below-cost goods from, engaging in opportu-
nistic and wasteful behavior that might otherwise tempt him. 
Second, the restitutionary remedy discourages the receiving party 
from breaching the contract in contexts where such a breach would be 
inefficient.79 The most obvious way the remedy can induce efficient 
behavior is by threatening to apply an expensive negative sanction (a 
76. If the supplier has provided goods or services to the breaching party, the gap between 
market price (or cost) and contract price may provide a good measure of these non-price bene-
fits. Restitution may thus, properly, allow her to recoup such benefits. 
77. See Kull, supra note 8. 
78. Avoiding such maneuvering can be important. For example, many commentators have 
argued that the policy of achieving such avoidance is the primary justification for criminalizing 
blackmail. See sources collected in Wendy J. Gordon, Truth and Consequences: The Force of 
Blackmail's Central Case, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1741 (1993) [hereinafter Gordon, Truth and 
Consequences]. 
79. As to a third economic concern-administrative costs-see infra Part VII. 
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"stick") to recipients who might otherwise be tempted to breach inef-
ficiently. The other way the remedy can induce efficient behavior is 
by safeguarding the "carrot" that the supplier has proffered. That is, 
the restitutionary remedy is an important way to enforce the carrot-
the "bribe" that a supplier has paid, via discounts and the like, to 
induce a recipient to stay in the contract. 
Third, our remedy encourages efficient contracting that might not 
otherwise take place. It does this primarily by allowing the parties to 
take advantage of asymmetries of information. 
A. A VOIDING WASTEFUL OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR 
It has been argued that without a contract cap in place, the sup-
plying party will wastefully engage in opportunistic behavior, trying to 
provoke a breach and that the defendant will wastefully engage in 
overprotective behavior trying to avoid a breach.80 However, this is 
unlikely to be a problem:81 If the losing party has indeed induced a 
breach, the court is not likely to award it the value of its services. 
More importantly, where non-price benefits make an ostensibly losing 
contract a mutually beneficial one, allowing restitution to be awarded 
above the contract price will produce better incentives for efficient 
behavior in regard to waste and other forms of opportunism than 
would capping the plaintiff's award at the contract price.82 · 
In these cases-which our rule defines, inter alia, as situations 
where the recipient party has notice of the supplier's non-price bene-
fits83-the recipient party knows of the other's eagerness to perform. 
Accordingly, the recipient (like the general contractor in Muir) can 
extract money from the supplier, either directly (as by bribes84) or 
indirectly (for example, the foot-dragging by the defendant in the 
80. Kull, supra note 8, at 1506-11; see LAYCOCK, TEACHER'S GumE, supra note 8, at 159. 
81. Those commentators who, like Professor Laycock, assume that judges often err in judg· 
ing who is at breach in construction contracts will disagree. See LAYCOCK, supra note 8, at 159 
("The risk of error is inherent in litigation; it is especially acute in litigation over long term 
contracts. . . . There is reason to avoid a measure of recovery that increases the stakes riding on 
an uncertain decision."); Kull, supra note 8, at 1510-11. 
82. Professor Kull emphasizes that the supplier will act opportunistically. But, as Professor 
Kull also acknowledges, if the restitutionary award (or other modes of measuring the true value 
of the contract to plaintiff) is not available, then the opportunism shoe fits on the other foot. See 
Kull, supra note 8, at 1503-04. 
83. For our proposed rule, see supra Part Il.C. 
84. See infra part VI.C.2. 
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Muir case ).85 Thus the opportunistic temptations open to the two par-
ties are, to say the least, symmetrical. Further, Professor Galligan has 
suggested that the tendency is for the recipients in construction con-
tracts, not the suppliers, to be the more opportunistic parties.86 
For example, the Muir defendant may have been so slow in pro-
viding the plaintiff with the needed material and energy (compressed 
air) because he knew that the plaintiff was much less likely to quit the 
job in a huff than were other subcontractors. In the clamor for mate-
rial and energy on a big hydroelectric project, the defendant contrac-
tor in Muir may have systematically discriminated against the plaintiff, 
keeping plaintiff's crews waiting uselessly but expensively for needed 
material. If the general contractor had known bad behavior could 
result in a money judgment reflecting plaintiff's full value (over 
$200,000), he might not have been so willing to play wasteful games. 
The danger of opportunism has another implication. As will be 
shown by numerical example below,87 in the absence of a rule like 
ours, a subcontractor or architect may not enter efficient contracts out 
of fear that the purchaser will manipulate her into spending more on 
performance than the contract is worth to her. 
In conclusion, underlying the arguments of those who favor con-
tract-price caps is a particular image of opportunism: that, under a 
rule like Muir's, a supplier who has made a bad deal will maneuver 
the other party into breaching, effectively making the other party pay 
for the supplier's own error or overconfidence. In the case of con-
tracts involving significant non-price benefits, the issue separates into 
two parts. 
First: Does a default rule like Muir's and ours, that allows suppli-
ers to collect for monies expended, encourage overconfident and 
incompetent suppliers to get themselves (and their contracting part-
ners) in over their heads? Second: Will a supplier who is over her 
head be able to maneuver the other party into doing something that 
the courts will interpret as an unjustified breach? 
The latter issue is the easier to address. If a court indeed cannot 
tell who is responsible for a contractual breakdown-so that a 
"maneuvered-against" party is treated as a breacher rather than as a 
85. If a recipient party (such as an owner or a general contractor) knows a subcontractor or 
architect values the contract at a high amount, the recipient party will have an incentive to 
extract this amount. 
86. See Galligan, supra note 23, at 840. 
87. See infra part VI.C. 
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rightful repudiator-then the fundamental law of construction con-
tracts needs to be rewritten. It is not appropriate to say, "the courts 
can't tell whose fault ·it really is,". and then ·formulate a remedy that 
seems to be premised on the notion that the courts will get it wrong 
most of the time. If the courts get it right most of the time, we submit 
that the Muir rule is best. 
As for the first issue-the overconfident supplier-we concede 
that a contract-price rule may discourage the confident from giving 
loss-leader deals more than our rule will. We even concede that per-
haps a contract-cap type rule might usefully encourage the incompe-
tent to enter another line of work.88 However, under our proposed 
rule the .over-confident incompetent will not be able to recover all 
costs because, under subpart (g) of the rule, ·the restitutionary remedy 
is limited ·by the market value of what was supplied.89 So even if the 
over-confident supplier can collect a bit over the contract price, our 
rule hardly induces massive over-investments by such a person. 
Also, beginners and newcomers to a field are the persons most 
likely to make loss-leader type offers. There is a social value in 
encouraging both beginner~ and established firms to expand into new 
fields. The default rule .should be in their favor. 
B. AssuRING THAT 1HE REcIPIBNT WILL NoT BREACH 
INEFFICIENTLY 
The basic notion of "inefficient breach" is simple: The presence of 
negative externalities tends to encourage over-investment in harmful 
behavior. Thus, where an actor can cause harm to another without 
being forced to pay a propedy-calibrated amount of damages~90 the 
actor may engage in the behavior even when· the (external, social) 
harm it causes outweighs the (private) benefits it brings him.91 A con-
tract remedy should provide the recipient party with incentive to 
88. We are indebted for this argument to Professor Robert Bone, who has suggested that a 
contract-price cap would usefully work- to distinguish competent from non-competent suppli-
ers-in that the latter would simply leave the field rather than take the risk that their loss-lead 
contract would simply mean long-term loss for them. 
89. See supr,a part II.C. 
90. The damage award is commonly assumed to be proper when set at a level equal to the 
harm caused. For an introduction to the more complex variations that can be rung on this scena-
rio (taking into account, in particular, less than certain enforcement), see A. MrrCHELL POLIN· 
SKY, !NTRODUCTJON TO LAW & ECONOMICS 34 (2d ed. 1989). 
91. See, e.g., RICHARD A. PosNER, EcoNoM1c ANALYSIS OP LAW 117 (4th ed.1993); Rob-
ert L. Birmingham, Breach· of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 
RUTGERS L. REv. 273 (1970). 
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breach the contract if, and only if, his benefits from the breach exceed 
the ~xpected value of the bargain to the supplier.92 That is one reason 
why in the Muir case, and in cases like it, we argue that the remedies 
should compensate the supplier with a measure that better approxi-
mates the expected value of the bargain.93 
If we agree that in Bo<;?mer v. Muir the subcontractor's expecta-
tions amounted to the market value or cost of his services and not 
merely to the contract price, then the contractor should not have 
breached the contract unless his profit from the new opportunity 
(over what the contractor would have earned from his contract with 
the subcontractor) exceeded what the subcontractor expected to gain, 
as reflected by his investment in supply efforts. The subcontractor had 
invested over $200,000 of his own money.94 The restitutionary remedy 
encourages the contractor to refrain from breaching in just this way: If 
he has to pay over $200,000, he will not breach unless the new oppor-
tunity is worth at least that much extra to him. 
If by contrast the contractor knew he wonld be required on 
breach to pay only the contract price of roughly $20,000, he will have 
incentive to breach whenever his benefits from the breach exceed that 
trifling amount. A remedy limited to contract expectancy, such as is 
92. Admittedly, we argue elsewhere in the comment for honoring a subjective expectation 
of non-price benefit, without requiring further inquiry into its objective reasonableness. It might 
be argued, therefore, that we claim too much here-that a subjective expectation is not a relia-
ble guide to judgments of economic efficiency. However, as we suggest elsewhere, see infra part 
VII.D.2, this is an area in which subjective assessments may be unusually reliable. See Saul 
Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REv. 771 (1982). 
Thus, while a supplier's provision of goods and services may be a less than perfect measure of 
the actual non-price benefits the contract will bring her, it may be the best measure available, 
and certainly less likely to cause systematic errors than would a rule that always capped the 
supplier's remedy at the contract price. 
93. Under our rule, the restitution measure applies ouly in contexts where both parties are 
aware of this value. There are many reasons why recovery should be allowed only if there is 
notice to the potential defendant. We have previously focused on fairness-oriented reasons. See 
supra part IV. However, notice also has an economic function. 
Remedies will have the desired impact only if those to be affected by them have some notice 
of the costs they will incur. Thus, unless both the price and non-price benefits that the plaintiff 
expects are known to the recipient party (so that he knows the likely amount of a restitutionary 
remedy that might be imposed upon him if he breaches), he might breach prematurely, for 
example, abandoning a contract worth $200,000 to the supplier in order to pursue a new oppor-
tunity worth only $75,000. 
94. Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570, 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933). 
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proposed by Professor Kull, therefore could encourage an inefficient 
breach.95 Our rule would better avoid such breaches. 
For another example, consider' an architect whp, wishing to estab-
lish her repntation, agrees to work for $5000 where the market value 
of her work (her opportunity cost) is $20,000.96 She expects $36,000 in 
reputational value to result from the completion. The building owner 
expects $16,000 profit from the architect's work. When the architect 
has put in $15,000 worth of work, the defendant is tempted by an 
opportunity that would earn him $9,000 more than he's making from 
the instant contract, but would require him to repudiate his contract 
with the architect. If he repudiates, it will mean a societal loss of at 
least $16,000 (that is, the excess of $36,000 over $20,000) which 
exceeds $9000. Let us assume that precedent tells the building owner 
that if he breaches, he will have to pay the architect a total of $15,000 
(less contract monies already paid) as our proposal would require. 
Such a payment would wipe out his anticipated gain from the new 
contract. Our rule would thus help society to avoid an allocative loss. 
C. EFFECTUATING CoASIAN "BRIBES" 
1. Inefficient Breaches and Transaction Costs 
Ian Macneil has pointed out that, but for transaction costs, ineffi-
cient breaches Will be avoided regardless of the remedial rule a court 
adopts. For instance, even if the recipient's liability were capped at 
the contract price, a supplier who valued the contract at a higher 
amount could "bribe" the recipient to stay in the contract,97 much as 
Professor Coase suggests that parties can "bargain around" inefficient 
legal rules.!18 Thus, one might draw from Professor Macneil's Coasian 
analysis the lesson that,· in the absence of transaction costs, nothing 
hangs on the choice between a limited restitution rule and a rule like 
ours that allows plaintiffs to collect in excess of the contract price. If 
95. However, in cases of truly losing contracts, or in cases where non-price benefits could 
be recoverable under reliance or expectation theories, the Muir rule would not be necessary to 
achieve proper discouragement of inefficient breaches. 
96. See Knapp v. Gaston Teyssier, 96 Pa. Super. 193 (1929), for a possible variant of such a 
case. 
97. Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REv. 947 
(1982) [hereinafter Macneil, Efficient Breach]. 
98. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). Professor 
Coase argued, inter alia, that in the absence of transaction costs, the law's initial placement of 
legal entitlements would be irrelevant to efficiency: When the law failed to award a resource to 
the highest-valued user, that user could pay the other party ("bribe" him) to transfer the 
resource. 
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transaction costs are low enough, the parties can compensate for any 
failure in the law by paying to alter the pattern of resource use. With 
these payments, which the literature ironically terms "bribes,"99 one 
party can persuade the other party to undertake value-maximizing 
behavior. 
. Professor Macneil's argument would not much undermine the 
importance of our thesis, however. First, in cases where breach occurs 
unexpectedly, transaction costs are likely to be sizeable and not sym-
metrical. We believe (by "casual empiricism"100) that parties who are 
about to breach rarely warn the other party in time to enable them to 
offer a pre-breach Coasian bribe to stay in the contract. If this is so, a 
proper crafting of the remedial rule is necessary. Second, and more 
importantly, when Coasian bribes are paid, restitutionary awards 
make them workable. 
2. Our Basic Argument: Encouraging Efficient Contracting by 
Utilizing Informational Asymmetries 
The whole point of the supplier giving a large price discount to 
the recipient is to persuade the latter to stay in a contract from which 
the supplier expects non-price benefits that the recipient is not 
required legally to give. Contracts containing such discounts may be 
value-maximiZing and may not occur unless the discount is refundable 
in cases of the recipient's breach. This is what the restitution remedy, 
freed of a contract-price cap, can accomplish. 
The price discount that a supplier agrees to in the hope of non-
price benefits is a Coasian bribe, and one paid well in advance of the 
other party's possible breach. Similarly, the goods or services that a 
supplier provides outside the strict requisites of a contract may be a 
Coasian bribe. The restitutionary remedy essentially mandates that 
99. Although the law and economics literature conventionally refers to Coasian payments 
as "bribes," the term is in fact a deliberate irony. Tu.ken literally, it is a misnomer. As Ronald 
Coase has pointed out, the term "bribe" connotes something illicit, while there is nothing neces-
sarily illicit about making payments to alter the assignment of legal entitlements-far from it. 
Telephone Interview with Ronald H. Coase, Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law 
School (June 20, 1994). As Professor Coase points out in The Problem of Social Cost, the very 
point of the market is to enable persons to shift resource entitlements to their highest-valued 
uses. Coase, supra note 98. 
100. We agree with Professor Macneil that the efficient-breach theory "is simply [a matter] 
of relative transaction costs in which no a priori assumptions can be made about the efficiency" 
of any particular remedy. Macneil, Efficient Breach, supra note '17, at 953 n.23. But it is not 
outrageous to use casual empiricism (as he notes), id. at 953 n.25, to estimate the likely transac-
tion costs and institutional patterns. · 
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these bribes be refunded if the recipient breaches the contract; the 
remedy therefore provides enforcement for Coasian bribes which may 
be necessary to .ensure efficient. resource use. 
In theory such bribes could also be enforced by explicit contrac-
tual provisions. However, the complexity and messiness that charac-
terize some contracts, such as the typical ongoing construction 
project, 101 may preclude continual specification by explicit agreement. 
Enforcement of these bribes is necessary if the law is to encourage 
efficient contracting by persons who v~lue contract completion above 
the contract price they can obtain. 
Also, our rule makes it easier for the parties to avail themselves 
of an asymmetry in information: In most cases the supplier knows the 
quality of her goods and services better than the recipient does, and is 
better able to calculate the odds that she will do good enough work 
that her hopes <?f reputational advantage or reciprocity will material-
ize. With our rule, such a supplier can bet on herself102 without 
requiring the other party to bet on more than his own likelihood of 
contract completion. 
3. Encouraging Efficient Contracting: A Numerical Example 
A rule that did not enforce Coasian bribes could discourage 
young architects or gung-ho contractors from selling their services 
efficiently.103 With a default rule such as Professor Kull's, that prohib-
ited such suppliers from recovering the value of their services in case 
of a buyer's breach, such suppliers might fear that after they had sunk 
significant c_osts into performing, the other party could manipulate 
them into expenomg still more. As a result, they could refuse to make 
an efficient contract now, out of fear that the other party's opportu-
nism might deprive them of the benefit of their Coasian bribes, and 
require them to "pay" even more than the contract was worth to 
them. · 
The price discoun~ theµiselves may lock the supplying paity into 
bad contracts if ili:e discounts cannot be recovered. For example, in a 
Muir-type case, assume that contract completion is worth $190,000 to 
the subcontractor ($170,000 in non-price benefits, plus $20,000 con-
tract price). Assume . further that the subcontractor has already 
101. See infra part VII.B. 
102. Cf. Levmore, supra note 92 (discussing self-assessment of damages). 
103. This might be particularly likely to occur in a buyer's market, where many architects 
were available. Cf. id. (discussing the self-assessment of damages). 
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"sunk" $189,000 into performance when the general contractor con-
tinues his foot-dragging. At this point, the subcontractor has two 
choices: either repudiating the contract, or sinking even more money 
(say, another $40,000) into performance. Without a restitutionary 
rule, the subcontractor upon repudiation would receive in his lawsuit 
only the contract price, approximately $20,000-a loss to the subcon-
tractor of $169,000 ($189,000 already expended less the contract price 
of $20,000). If the contract when completed would be worth $190,000 
to him, the subcontractor will lose less by continufug to perform-
$39 ,000104-than he would by repudiation-which wonld involve a 
loss of $169,000. As a result, he would continue perforce to perform. 
If a restitutionary rule, like that proposed above,105 is in place, he 
. could receive $189,000 if he sues-giving him a tool to "persuade" the 
other party stop its foot-dragging and perhaps even renegotiate the 
contract price.106 · 
In this way the subcontractor might (absent the proposed rule) be 
forced into paying much more than the contract was worth to him. 
The restitution rule, by contrast, might discourage the general contrac-
tor from doing such foot-dragging in the first place, and assure the 
subcontractor that he will not be manipulated into a net loss position. 
He will then feel freer to enter into efficient contracts. 
D. Two CHALLENGES 
1. Second-Order or Second-Best Allocative Effects 
Even the simplest case can be criticized as ignoring second-best 
problems and se~ond-order effects. For example, against our thesis it 
might be argued that the reputational or other non-price benefits in a 
case like Boomer v. Muir may represent merely a private benefit with 
no allocative consequences. In such an instance, what appears to be 
efficient may not in reality be so. 
Consider, for example, our argument regarding the desirability of 
preventing .inefficient breaches. In the above architect example the 
104. Tue $39,000 is the plaintiff's costs of $229,000 ($189,000 already sunk, plus $40,000 
more to be expended), less $190,000 as the -value of contract completion. 
105. See supra part II.C. 
106. Ideally, this renegotiated price would cover additional costs attributable to the foot-
dragging. However, there is a possibility that the supplier could use the repudiation option to 
squeeze additional monies out of the other party. This consideration puts a challenge to our 
rule, discussed above at Part VI.A. 
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proposed rule appeared to provide society a means to avoid an alloca-
tive loss by encouraging the building owner not to breach. However, 
the private gall) to the architect may not really have translated into 
the same amount of allocative gain. By establishing herself as an 
independent architect via this project, the plaintiff may simply draw 
future business that comes at the expense of other architects, so that 
the reputational gain might be basically transferred from these other 
architects to her without representing an allocative gain. If so, the 
building owner's temptation may not have represented an inefficient 
breach after all. 
In such a context, we can only speculate about the form second-
order effects might take. But it seems likely that if the architect's rep-
utation did grow in the way she hopes, it would increase the price 
competition among architects, which is allocatively desirable. Thus, 
though it is difficult to give a precise value to the allocative pay-off 
from deterring this defendant's breach, the likely effect of adopting a 
restitutionary measure of relief seems positive.107 
2. Discouraging Some Potentially Efficient Contracts 
It might be argued that under our rule, some potentially efficient 
contracts might not be entered into. Conceivably, a potential 
employer of hungry suppliers or up-and-coming young architects will 
not do business with them out of fear that if he. breaches, he will have 
to pay a restitutionary award above the contract price (or that the 
threat of such a remedy will force him to disadvantageously renegoti-
ate the contract price).108 If some such forgone contracts may be effi-
cient ones, it would be argued, this may decrease the economic gains 
otherwise to be achieved through our rule. 
Whether or not otherwise efficient contracts would be forgone as 
a result of our rule, 109 the opposite rule causes at least an equal degree 
107. Moreover, the issue of "second best" applies not only to our rule but to any rule. Thus, 
a limited-restitutionary rule would face the same challenge, and Professor Kull has made no 
showing that in a second-best world the direction of the shifts caused by his rule would be as 
likely as ours to be positive. 
108. Such fear may be particularly likely if our rule applies even when a purchaser's breach 
is caused by factors outside of his control. Our current rule does not limit the application of 
above-contract-price restitutionary awards to instances where the defendant has breached in bad 
faith. As indicated, we have not ruled out the possibility that such a limitation may be desirable. 
See infra note 145. 
109. The forgone-contract problem will likely be a difficulty only in the case of a buyer's 
market, that is, where the buyers have many suppliers of goods and services vying for their 
business and can pick and choose among them. In a seller's market, where, for example, a 
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of loss. That is, as discussed above,110 without our rule, potential sup-
pliers may be discouraged from entering into efficient contracts out of 
a fear they will be manipulated into putting more into contract per-
formance than the contract is worth to them. 
Fmally, the parties can reverse our rule by agreement. For exam-
ple, a young architect who plans on giving below-cost services and 
wants to reassure potential clients that their liability will be limited, 
can waive any restitutionary claim.111 
Admittedly, the opposite rule is equally reversible by the parties. 
But there is an advantage in making our rule the default in non-losing 
contract situations: The silence allowed by our rule permits the flexi-
bility necessary to so many construction contract situations, particu-
larly in cases where the parties' duties are interdependent, as in 
Muir.112 
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MEASURE OF ENRICHMENT: 
PLAINTIFF 's CosTs, MARKET VALUE OF PLAINTIFF 's 
PERFORMANCE, OR DEFENDANT'S GAIN 
Of the many possible measures of unjust enrichment that might 
be used in these cases, let us consider three: One measure is the plain-
tiff's costs; a second is the market value of what the plaintiff supplied; 
and a third is the increase in the value of the defendant's assets113 that 
resulted from the plaintiff's efforts. Under our rule,114 we propose 
setting a restitutionary remedy equal to either of the first two meas-
ures, whichever is less. 
We chose whatever is less between these first two measures in 
order to keep the plaintiff working efficiently. Even if the subcontrac-
tor is maneuvered into doing extra work, she should spend no more 
on that extra performance than a competent subcontractor would.115 
If she is working efficiently, her costs should be close to the market 
landowner may be desperate for a competent architect or contractor to begin work on her land, 
such contract discouragement is unlikely to take place. 
110. See supra part VI.C3. 
111. By bargaining for low liquidated damages the parties can contract out of restitutionary 
awards. See Lars A. Stole, The Economics of Liquidated Damage Clauses in Contractual Envi-
ronments with Private Information, 8 J.L. EcoN. & 0Ro. 582 (1992). 
112. See infra part VII.B. 
113. A fuller discussion would separately parse, for example, defendant's subjective valua-
tion and the market valuation of the asset 
114. See supra part II.C. 
115. See infra part VIII.B. 
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value. To the extent the costs are significantly higher, fairness to the 
defendant nevertheless suggests that the most that can be asked of 
him is to make the plaintiff whole. 
More controversially, we argue that either of the first two meas-
ures (plaintiff's cost or market value of plaintiff's effort) is preferable 
to awarding the plaintiff only the amount of enrichment the defendant 
experienced. We make this recommendation-despite the fact that it 
may be perceived as inconsist~nt with the restitutionary impulse116-
as a means of assuring that the economic functions of our rule can be 
achieved. 
Measuring restimtion ·only by the defendant's gain would 
encourage the defend&nt to ·be wasteful with plaintiff's efforts. The 
defendant should instead tie encouraged to value what he receives at 
its full market value. The contractor in the Muir case undoubtedly 
valued plaintiff's goods and services at less than market price because 
that is how the contractor was ch~ged and that is how he behaved. 
That is, had the defendant known that he would be required to pay 
the full market value, he would not have dragged his feet on providing 
material and energy to the subcontractor. To limit the amount he will 
have to pay upon breach to the value he gained from plaintiff's per-
formance-rather than requiring the defendant to pay something 
equivalent to the social loss-would merely repeat the mistake. 
Another reason for setting the measure of restitutionary remedy 
at social loss is. to deter inefficient breach, as discussed above. Also, 
unless the contract re~edy effectively returns to suppliers any dis-
count they gave the recipient in the expectation of non-price benefits, 
some suppliers will be discouraged from entering into efficient con-
tracts. To avoid this result, the measure of relief should be keyed 
more to the plaintiff's loss (or the value of the plaintiff's effort) rather 
than keyed to the defendant's gain. 
VII. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Ordinarily, law does not require people to pay for all benefits 
which they receive in nondonative contexts. That is so even where 
they are aware of the other party's expectations for which the benefits 
are given, and even when they in bad faith violate those expectations. 
116. See, e.g., Pettit, supra note 6 (arguing that using a measure tied to plaintiff's loss rather 
than defendant's gain is indicative of a non-restitutionary rationale). 
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One of the reasons for the law is the concern that an inquiry into such 
expectations will result in judicial administrative costs that are too 
high. Under a limited set of circumstances, however, the award of 
restitution for such expectations may impose only low administrative 
costs: where a contract exists, which the courts must perforce investi-
gate, and where by its nature, judicial administration may be less 
expen~ive (and more practical) than requiring detailed specification of 
mutually advantageous contract terms an,d the parties' expectations. 
Such is suggested by our arguments elsewhere.117 
The argument for limiting restitutionary remedies to the contract 
price in cases such as Muir rests in part on the desirability of using 
judicial resources frugally: The costs of ascertaining the contract price 
are said to be significantly lower than the costs of ascertaining the 
market price or the plaintiff's costs118 because, Professor Kull argues, 
the supplier's expectations are not sufficiently specific.119 Therefore, 
as a measure of the remedy, contract price is preferable. We argue 
that Professor Kull's concern with administrative costs is appropriate 
but over8tated for a number of reasons. 
First, although contra~tual specificity reduces the costs of judicial 
administration, the cases in which courts grant restitution meet an 
acceptable standard of specificity, although a somewhat lower stan-
dard. More importantly, many contracts are not amenable to a high 
degree of certainty; they deal with unpredictable and changeable situ-
ations in which specific provisions may be virtually impossible to 
establish. Many of the cases in which courts grant restitution involved 
precisely such contracts {for example, construction contracts). 
Second, even assuming that the costs of distinguishing between 
truly and apparently losing contracts and the costs of ascertaining 
measures of the plaintiff's non-price intangible benefits are higher 
than the costs of ascertaining the contract prices, we argue that the 
difference is relatively small. Professor Kull's own rule requires courts 
to make inquiries outside the four comers of the contract.120 
117. For a discussion of the inability to sue for expectations standing alone, see supra Part V. 
This theme is also developed further immediately below. See infra text accompanying notes 118-
21. 
118. Kull, supra note 8, at 1495. 
119. Id. 
120. As we Understand Professor Kull's proposed rule, the cost savings of utilizing contract 
price will be one-sided. Contract price will serve as a ceiling on restitutionary damages, not as a 
floor. His proposed rule would allow the breaching defendant to seek judicial evaluation of the 
plaintiff's part performance if the defendant argues that the plaintiff's actual costs or market 
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Third, in designing rules, courts can legitimately decide that jus-
tice and economics are not coterminous and that justice must be the 
leading factor. While one can debate the proper interplay between 
economics and "other justice/'121 we need not enter here into such a 
debate extensively, for we argue that our approach "buys', a more just 
approach at only minimal economic cost to the system. Thus, 
although we believe that saving judicial costs by requiring extreme 
specificity in a contract.may be a good thing, it is not good enough to 
trump the real and fair expectations of the parties. 
In the next section we discuss the type of contract that is not ame-
nable to specificity and closure and that because of its nature renders 
judicial interference inevitable. Then we demonstrate the limited 
nature of the additional administrative costs involved in distinguishing 
between truly and apparently losing. contracts and the limited addi-
tional administrative costs involved in quantifying restitutionary 
awards. 
B. CONTRACT SPECIFICITY AND CONTRACT CLOSURE 
The argument that all or most non-price benefits should not be 
recognized under contract law is based on a view of a contract as a 
"spof, relationship: impersonal, usually relatively short-term, and 
"frozen/'· In contrast to agreements within ongoing relationships, this 
type of contract must contain specific and unchangeable terms, 
designed to limit, rather than leave room for, renegotiation.122 In a 
mobile society, where excess performance costs to the parties cannot 
be later adjusted within the framework of an ongoing relationship, this 
contract model is useful and appropriate-specificity and closure are 
crucial to reduce misunderstandings and breaches of contract. Fur-
ther, in an unstable environment, contract specificity and closure bring 
additional benefits, such as providing each party a basis for future 
planning. 
price are lower than the contract price. Under the proposed rule, therefore, judicial costs will be 
reduced with respect to the plaintiff's claims but not with respect to the defendant's claims. · 
121. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 30, at 289-308; THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM 
NOWHERE 185-88 (1986) (discussing generally the interplay between deontologic and conse-
quentialist ethics); Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Co"ective Justice and Its Utilitarian Con· 
straints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1978); see also Gordon, Truth and Consequences, supra note 78, at 
1785 (One's "final judgment on ••. any law ... should depend neither on consequentialism nor 
on deontologic morality, but on some as yet unstated combination of the two."). 
122. Professor Macneil has identified the problem of specificity costs as a governance prob-
lem, for which the courts provide rules of adjusting the contract terms. Macneil, supra note 61; 
see also Galligan, supra note 23 (identifying the same problem). 
1994] COMMENT: ENFORCING COASIAN BRIBES 1555 
Some types of contracts, however, by their very nature, cannot be 
sufficiently specific or provide total closure. These types of contracts 
are especially amenable to restitutionary remedies, where greater 
judicial discretion is inescapable.123 
The Muir case and similar construction cases provide a good illus-
tration of such contracts. Specific and predetermined terms in con-
struction contracts are costly124 because construction involves many 
unknown and unpredictable developments and is likely to require 
continuous contract changes. Therefore, these contracts do not con-
tain the terms that cover all eventualities and do not lend themselves 
to full closure. Even the most detailed of these contracts might cover 
a smaller percentage of possible contingencies than other types of 
contracts, and everyone involved understands that the contract serves 
as a framework for renegotiation. A party may give more than is 
specified in the contract and expect to be rewarded, either during the 
contract period or later.125 
In the Muir case, for example, the allocation of the parties' obli-
gations and decisionmaking power required continuous cooperation 
and adjustments among them. Much depended on mutual self-limita-
tion. Because the contractor was paying for m,aterials and energy, the 
subcontractor had little self-interested incentive to use them fru-
gally;126 because the subcontractor was paying his crew's wages, the 
contractor had little self-interested incentive to keep the subcontrac-
tor's crew fully occupied. Similarly, while the subcontractor under-
took to finish the work within a specific period, the contractor 
123. It has been suggested that the doctrine within restitution law that has the primary role 
in cases like Boomer v. Muir-namely, quantum meruit-has its roots in the common law rather 
than in equity. See Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Sum-
mer 1993, at 53. That is largely irrelevant, however; the role of judicial discretion that has been 
traditionally thought of as "equitable" is now spread throughout our system, largely without 
reference to whether the matter at issue has historical roots on the law or the equity side. Id. at 
71-73. 
In any event, the suggestion that restitution's roots are primarily legal may not be entirely 
accurate because throughout the centuries the common law courts have absorbed into contract 
law the holding and remedies of the chancery courts. See, e.g., A. W.B. SIMPSON, The Penal Bond 
with Conditional Defeasance, in LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HlsroRY: EssAYs ON THE CoM-
MON LAW 111 (1987). 
124. See Galligan, supra note 23, at 811. 
125. Just as it is costly to specify the parties' obligations in the contract in advance, it can be 
also costly to specify all the interim arrangements on which the parties agree during the contract 
period. Many terms might be left open, and, we assume that in most cases the parties renegoti-
ate and settle. 
126. The contractor therefore also asserted control over the energy and power in breach of 
the contract 
1556 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1519 
controlled the work's progress by determining when to supply the 
materials and power. Thus, each party~s performance depended on 
the cooperation of the other; that made it difficult for the parties to 
determine their responsibilities with accuracy in advance. It is not sur-
prising that during the contract period the parties renegotiated the 
terms of the contract. This contract was amenable to mutual adjust-
ments, not to specificity or, closure.127 
Arguably, the supplying party should specify ~ the contract that 
non-price benefits exist and should be recouped if the other party 
breaches the contract. The answer to this aJ"gument is, first, that it is 
costly to specifically add such ·expectations, especially to anticipate 
accurately all situations where one party or the other will bear the 
risk. Second, the recipient party has no real need for such specifica-
tion to protect himself from paying the supplier more than the worth 
of what he has received, since if the architect or other supplier over-
estimated her abilities, the market price for services of the quality she 
rendered will cap the measure of relief, even under a restitutionary 
rule.128 Third, we make a normative claim: If what the supplier gives 
is indeed worth more than the contract price, and the recipient 
breaches, then it is legitimate to charge the recipient for what he has 
received. If this normative claim is correct, it should be up to the 
party seeking the nort-fair allocation to so spe~ify. 
C. WHAT RuLE SHOULD THE CouRTS AooPT? 
' If Professor Kull is right about ti:uly losing contracts and we are 
right about apparently losing contracts, wh~t rule should the courts 
adopt? If administrative costs were zero, we would recommend a rule 
requiring the courts to distinguish between the two kinds of contracts 
and apply our .pro-restitution rule in cases of ostensibly but not truly 
losing contracts, and Professor Kull's narrow restitution approach in 
cases of truly losing contracts. 
. ' 
In the real world, however, cost must be considered. The ques-
tion then is: What rule would involve the highest costs? Would it be 
(i) a rule under which courts would try to distinguish b,etween the two 
. . 
127. See Galligan, supra note 23, at 800. 
128. See sub-part (g) of the proposed rule, supra Part 11.C. On the contrary, it might be 
argued that being forced to pay even market price for something one hasn't ordered causes 
harm. (This is sometimes known as the argument of "subjective valuation.") This argument has 
only limited merit in the context where the party being char'ged is a wrongdoer-a breaching 
party. 
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classes of cases? (ii) a rule where courts would apply our pro-restitu-
tion rule to all cases, thus triggering the costs and arguable injustices 
that critics of the majority rule are concerned about in losing contract 
situations? (iii) a rule under which courts would cap the plaintiff's 
recovery at the contract price in all cases, thus triggering the costs and 
arguable injustices about which our ComJ;tlent is concerned? 
D. ADMINISTRATIVE CqsTS INvoLVED IN OuR PROPOSED 
APPROACH 
1. The Costs of Distinguishing Between Actually and Ostensibly 
Losing Contracts 
A rule that requires courts to distinguish between losing and 
seemingly losing contracts could be costly, involving the courts in fac-
tual investigation of the truthfulness, reasonableness, and accuracy of 
the plaintiff's expectations .. Yet, in some cases relatively little cost is 
involved in judicial distinction between losing and apparently losing 
contracts. 
For example, as we discussed earlier, the presence of an 
extremely deep discount at the time of contracting will signal that 
both parties probably knew what they were doing, in expectation of 
non-price benefits.129 Conversely, if the "loss" occurs because of an 
unanticipated, sudden change in market price after contract forma-
tion, this will likely indicate that the supplier's loss did not result from 
a calculated reach for non-price benefits. The determination in both 
cases is unlikely to involve high administrative costs.130 
2. The Costs of Quantifying Non-price Benefits 
We assume that in most cases where there is, at the time of the 
contract formation, a large difference between the contract price on 
the one hand, and the market price or the supplier's costs on the other 
hand, this difference represents the intangible advantages that the 
supplier expects from the contract or its completion. That is, the sup-
plier's investment in the contract above the price he expects to receive 
can be a measure of the non-price benefits he expects. 
129. This analysis may be complicated if duration was an important part of the contract. See 
supra part ill.A.3. 
130. As for high performance costs ~at result from disagreements over what the contract 
requires .the supplier to do, see supra note 23 (showing that our restitutionary approach is consis-
tent with the pattern Professor Galligan has seen in these cases). 
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In these situations, the judicial costs of quantifying the non-price 
expected benefits from the contract would be quite low. Once non-
price expectations are shown,131 the courts would establish the differ-
ence between the contract and market prices. That difference could 
constitute the amount by which the supplier valued the contract's 
existence and completion132 and provide a more accurate measure of 
the supplier's reliance and expectation losses than will the contract 
price. This method helps quantify and monetize subjective expecta-
tions and answers one of the objections to the majority rule and to our 
argument. For example, the supplier's costs can be established by 
receipts and other proof of payment. Even though the establishment 
of market price depends on the liquidity of the market, in many cases 
market price can be ascertained with little effort.133 
In addition, the courts have not one but two measures by which 
to evaluate expected non-price benefits: the supplier's actual costs 
(easily verifiable by receipts and means of payments) and the market 
price, which may be often (not always) easily available. The market 
price for the supplier's services and goods provides an inexpensive 
method to test whether her costs were too high due to inefficient per-
formance. The supplier's costs can help ascertain the market price in 
an illiquid market. 
The same reliance on supplier's costs (or market value) should be 
followed even if the supplier overestimated the intangible benefits 
that she would receive from the contract. Admittedly, in such a case 
the supplier would offer services at a contract price that is too low, 
and the difference between this low price and market price would be 
too high to represent the supplier's expectations objectively. If proof 
of the objective value of expectations were allowed, the costs of judi-
cial administration would indeed rise.134 Professor Kull's objection to 
131. See the proposed rule, supra Part II.C. 
132. If the supplier really did not value the contract, she would not continue to perform but 
would rather agree with the defendant to terminate the relationship. The facts of cases such as 
Muir, however, are otherwise: The underpricing supplier continues to perform; she is not the one 
who breaches. 
133. We admit this will not always be the case. 
134. A factual inquiry into such questions could be expensive. For example, the supplier 
may have assigned a 40% probability to the expectation that the contract would enhance her 
reputation and bring her jobs worth $100,000; or she may have believed that there was a 40% 
probability that the other party would reciprocate with future assignments worth $100,000; or, 
perhaps like the subcontractor in Muir, she may have continued to perfonn at a loss due to the 
other party's breach because she evaluated her chance of obtaining $100,000 worth of additional 
work at 40%. In all these cases the supplier would rationally have invested in the contract any 
amount up to $40,000 (40% of $100,000). Suppose, however, that the hopes of the plaintiff/ 
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restitutionary remedy in the Muir case then might be more compel-
ling, even as to the ostensibly losing, but actually profitable contracts 
on which we focus. 
Our answer to this counter-argument and the concern with 
administrative burden is as follows: Plaintiffs may, and indeed do, err 
in evaluating probabilities of intangible benefits ex ante. But so long 
as a defendant has notice of a plaintiff's expectations, and so long as 
plaintiff gave the defendant benefits because of her expectations, such 
errors should be deemed legally irrelevant in cases such as ours.135 
Market value (or cost) should be the governing measure. A supplier's 
overly optimistic expectations will benefit the other party if that party 
does not breach and benefit the supplier if the other party does 
breach.136 Moreover, it is the defendant, the receiving party, who has 
the power to decide which party would bear the cost137 of the plain-
tiff's potentially unwarranted optimism.138 
Further, there may be little substantive payoff from allowing 
proof on whether plaintiff's expectations are realistic. Evaluation of 
probabilities ex ante is rarely exact; what may seem uurealistic and 
erroneous post facto may be rational ex ante. Besides, the 'supplier's 
calculation of probabilities should be determined as of the contract 
date; these probabilities, which may change thereafter, are highly 
speculative. Therefore, we believe that a breaching party who has 
received benefits as a result of a supplier's expectations should be 
allowed to argue only that he had no notice of the other party's expec-
tation. If he had such notice, the breaching party should not be 
allowed to raise the issue of how justified the supplier's expectations 
were. The plaintiff's expenditures-which can be determined with a 
fair degree of ease-should be sufficient proof. 
subcontractor were far too high and that the defendant could show that plaintiff's expectations 
should not have exceeded a 15% chance of $100,000 (for an expected value of $15,000). 
135. Legal irrelevancies give rise to little in the way of judicial administrative cost. The 
amount expended-its cost or market price-should be the measure of relief. Even if the 
receiving party breaches and is required to pay for expenditures that the plaintiff made on the 
basis of an unrealistic expectation, the breaching party (like the contractor in Muir) has received 
the benefit of these expenditures. 
136. The gain from the breaches, however, is not likely to provide the supplier with incen-
tives to cause a breach. This argument is discussed in Part VI of this Comment 
137. Thus, if the contract price is unrealistically low, so long as the receiving party does not 
breach the contract it benefits from the supplier's mistaken expectations. If the receiving party 
does breach the contract, it will pay a restitutionary award that is higher than plaintiff's objective 
expectation. 
138. For a discussion of opportunistic behavior, see supra Part VI.A. 
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Thus, while it is true that the contract price is easily ascertainable, 
it is also true that generally there are easily-derived market figures for 
the cost (or value) of most of the supplied goods and services. The 
difference between, the two figures. can be established with relatively 
little additional expense to the judicial system. 
E. COMPARING THE .ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF OrHER OPTIONS 
The current judicial majority rule does not distinguish between 
losing and non-losing contracts. Neither does the approach of Profes-
sor Kull who would cap the recovery at the contract price. We think 
that an overbroad rule can be legitimate whenever the likely adminis-
trative cost of distinguishing between the truly losing contracts and 
the seemingly losing contracts exceeds the allocative costs · of the 
overbreadth. 
The majority rule is likely to have fewer overbreadth costs than a 
rule like Professor Kull's if we are correct that business people will 
usually be rational and informed. Under our assumptions, in the cases 
when business people·-agree to provide goods or services at substan-
tially lower price than market price, or continue to perform contracts 
at highly discounted prices, ostensibly losing contracts will far out-
number real losing contracts. For if contracts are truly losers, business 
people will seek to be released of them when the other party to the 
contract seems to wish release also. Therefore, when the administra-
tive costs of distinguishing between apparently and truly losing con-
tracts are ·very high, the current majority rule is probably better than 
the one Professor Kull is recommending. 
VIII. IS IT REALLY RESTIWTION? 
A. Is IT REALLY REsTITUTioN IF THE REcoVERY EXCEEDS THE 
CONTRACT PRICE? 
Some commentators argue that awards in excess of the contract 
price cannot be justified by the law of restitution. For example, one of 
Professor Kull's primary contentions is that, as a conceptual and defi-
nitional matter, a defendant contracting party cannot be "unjustly 
enriched" by· possessing what the plaintiff has given him in the course 
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of performing the contract if the defendant is required to pay the con-
tract price.139 Once that price is paid, Professor Kull argues, there is 
no enrichment left for which plaintiff can seek restitution.140 
We agree with Professor Kull that it can be appropriate for a res-
titution court to look to the parties to evaluate the worth of what they 
expect to receive during the course of a contract.141 But such an anal-
ysis hardly leads unequivocally to Professor Kull's result. In our view, 
the Muir-type rule that we advocate requires the defendant to give the 
plaintiff the closest equivalent to what, in exchange for plaintiff's per-
formance, he agreed to pay initially: contract price and contract 
completion. 
Moreover, the Muir-type result is consistent with the principle 
that Peter Birks, in his treatise on the English law of restitution, calls 
"free acceptance."142 Professor Birks suggests, as a doctrinal matter, 
that parties who give benefits in the hope of being repaid have a 
ground for seekjng restitution if the receiving party knew the first was 
giving the goods or services "in the. expectation of being repaid," and 
was in a position to disabuse the supplying party of his expectation but 
refused to do so in the hope of getting something for nothing. In such 
a,case, the recipient may be liable in quantum meruit (for goods) or 
quantum valebat (for services). An example Professor Birks gives is 
of a window cleaner who comes to his house 
merely in the hope that I, like my various neighbors, would want the 
[windows] done and would agree to pay .... [H]ad I been out, he 
would have had no basis on which to claim restitution. But because 
I stood by and tacitly accepted the work he can ... claim its reason-
able value. This, therefore, is the essential point: ,volunteers who 
are disappointed risk-takers can get restitution on the basis of free 
acceptance.143 
Like a building proprietor who coyly hides behind the curtains until 
the window washer has cleaned each pi;me, or like a homeowner who 
139. Kull, supra note 8, at 1478-84. 
140. Id. 
141. We do no more than concede it may sometimes be appropriate to proceed in this way. 
But even if we were to c0ncede arguendo Professor Kull's larger contention-that a restitution 
court must always defer to the parties' pre-performance c6ntractual evaluations, id.-our result 
differs from his because we have a different view of the parties' pre~performance expectations. 
142. See BIRKS, supra note 23, at 265-93. Professor Birks' "free acceptance" principle may 
be 6verbroad; that is, from both a policy and doctrinal perspective, "free acceptance" may not 
always provide a sufficient justification for granting restitution. Nevertheless, some notion akin 
to "free acceptance" is surely operative in the case law and is suggestive for the problem at hand. 
143. Id. at 266, 104. 
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stands· by while his neighbor builds a party wall that the homeowner 
knows the neighbor expects him to help pay for,144 the defendant in 
Muir should not be able to come out at the last mip,ute145 and disown 
what he has irrevocably received. 
B. Is IT REALLY REsTITUTION IF THE REcoVERY ExcEEos THE 
INCREASE IN THE v ALUE OF DEFENDANT'S ASSETS? 
One may ask: Is the majority rule really restitutionary if it 
requires a defendant to do more than disgorge-that is, if it requires 
payment of more in a lawsuit than an amount representing the value 
(subjective or objective) that the defendant places on the benefit 
received? Definitions of restitution typically focus on "the recapture 
of a benefit conferred on the defendant" and remedies that measure 
"recoveries ... by the amount of a defendanf s unjust enrichment.''146 
Yet under our rule a defaulting defendant may have to pay out an 
amount equivalent to the plaintiffs costs (or to the value of the goods 
and services that the plaintiff provided), even if this amount is higher 
than the increase in the asset value147 p~oduced by the plaintiff's 
efforts. As a result, our rule might be criticized as inconsistent with 
standard definitions of restitution.148 
144. See Day v. Caton, 119 Mass. 513 (1876) (stating that "silence with a knowledge that 
another was doing valuable work for [one's] benefit, and with the expectation of payment" may, 
as a factual matter, "indicate[] that consent which would give rise to the inference of a con-
tract"). Note this is a case where a contract could be implied in fact, while we are dealing with 
contracts implied in law. In a case like Day, we think either analysis could be used. 
145. It might be argued when a recipient like the defendant in Muir is silent while receiving 
significantly discoimted benefits, that silence does not necessarily hide a bad faith desire (like 
that of the homeowner in the window-washer example) to get something for nothing. Perhaps 
the recipient is in good faith during the bulk of the supplier's performance and only at the last 
minute discovers an irresistible temptation which leads him to breach the contract. Our current 
"rule", see supra part 11.C, does not distinguish between good faith and bad faith receipt of 
discounted supplies; we have not closed our minds to the possibility that it might be advisable to 
make such a distinction. 
146. LoN L. FUu.ER & MELVIN ARON E1sENBERo, BASIC CoNTRAcr LAW 295 (4th ed. 
1981) (emphasis added). 
147. The reference to the defendant's "asset value" assumes that the defendant is the owner 
on whose project the supplier/plaintiff was working. The concept is equally applicable when the 
defendant is merely responsible for a project on a third party's land-in such a case, the 
"increase in asset value" might be translated into the "decrease in the defendant's responsibili-
ties" produced by plaintiff. 
Thus, the defendant in Muir did not own the land on which the hydroelectric dam was built; 
his concern was with fulfilling.the duties of a general contractor. He fulfilled these duties by, 
among other things, hiring subcontractors like the plaintiff. A narrow view of restitution might 
argue that the plaintiff had benefitted the defendant only to the extent the plaintiff's efforts had 
saved the defendant money in fulfilling his overall responsibilities. 
148. See Kull, supra note 8, at 1480; Petit, supra note 6. 
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However, such a criticism would depend on defining the slippery 
notions of "benefit conferred" or "unjust enrichment." Looking to 
the increase in a defendant's asset value is not the ouly plausible way 
to measure the defendant's enrichment; it is equally plausible to argue 
that a defendant that received goods and services at a discount and 
then breached the contract is enriched at least to the extent of the 
discount on the price. 
Moreover, the Boomer v. Muir case also demonstrates how par-
ties can change their balance of power within the contract and move 
towards a :fiduciary relationship, which lends itself to restitutionary 
remedies. In the Muir case, the contractor controlled the timing of 
the delivery of the materials to the subcontractor. In addition, and in 
violation of his contract obligation, the contractor retained control 
over the source of energy that the subcontractor needed to perform 
his tasks. Thus, the contractor "misappropriated" the power to use 
the source of energy that belonged to the subcontractor and diverted 
the use to some other works in which the contractor was engaged. 
Arguably, the benefits that the contractor received from such a 
wrongful use rightly belonged to the subcontractor. 
Or, alternatively, it might be argued that the defendant received 
the "benefit" which he sought or accepted, namely, goods and serv-
ices, from the plaintiff.149 That being so, it may not be inconsistent 
with a proper respect for the defendant's autonomy to assume that the 
defendant saw the performance as itself a benefit to him. Certainly 
the defendant might have been wrong-the performance may end up 
being more costly than the increase in asset value it produced-and 
certainly the defendant might have hoped to get the goods and serv-
ices at a below-market price. But if he has induced or accepted these 
items, it seems appropriate to make the defendant pay their market 
price (or cost, whichever is less) since by committing a breach so 
material that the other party is entitled to repudiate, the defendant 
has forfeited the contract through which he might have obtained the 
below-market price.150 
149. This is the rationale implied by United States v. Zara Contracting, Inc., 146 F.2d 606, 
611 (2d Cir. 1944) (Since the "plaintiff's performance here is 'part of the very performance' for 
which the defendant had bargained, 'it is to be valued •.• by the amount for which such services 
and materials as constituted the part performance could have been purchased from one in the 
plaintiff's position at the time they were rendered.'") (quoting REsrATEMENT (F1RST) OF CoN-
TRAcrs § 347 crnt. c (1932)). 
150. Robert Childres & Jack Garamella, The Law of Restitution and the Reliance Interest in 
Contract, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 433 (1969). Childres and Garamella seem to think that those who 
approve the Boomer v. Muir approach do so only because they believe that the breacher of a 
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Critics of the .majority rule have argued that one cannot so dis-
pense with the contract, since (it is argued) it is only the contract that 
keeps the supplier from bein:g an "officious intermeddler" unable to 
recover on a restitutionary basis.151 ·But that is not so; as we saw ear-
lier, one who accepts goods or services with a knowledge that they are 
not a gift, and who has an opportunity to reject them, may be respon-
sible for them in restitution.152 
But all this is somewhat beside· the point; as intimated above, the 
definition of "benefit" or "enrichment" is a notoriously unstable basis 
for argument. It is better to note three things. First, contract doctrine 
has historically used the value of plaintiff's goods and services as a 
restitutionary measure.153 Second, the restitutionary principles that 
favor avoiding harm to the defendant-such as· those principles that 
would measure a recovery by the defendant's own experience of bene-
fit-are premised upon a defendant's innocent passivity.154 For exam-
ple, when a creditor receives two full payments on the same debt, he 
contract is a morally "bad man." I<J.: at 435. However, we do not see that belief as necessary to 
our argument Once a contract is repudiated, quantum meruit seems a fairly neutral fall-back 
position. It was even used in a case where neitlter plaintiff nor defendant was at fault in any way. 
See the discussion of Vickery v. Ritchie, 88 N.E. 835 (Mass. 1909), supra note 7. 
151. See, e.g., LAYCOCK, TEACHERS' GumE, supra note 8. 
152. See supra text accompanying notes 143-44. Such a principle of "free acceptance" may 
however be dangerously broad. 
153. Thus, tlte same casebook that presented a standard definition of restitution-that is, 
one focused on the defendant's benefit, see supra text accompanying note 146-also notes ti.tat 
restitution has a significant overlap with reliance and its focus on the plaintiff's loss. FULLER & 
EISENBERG, supra note 146, at 311 (citing Childres & Garamella, supra note 150, at 435-36). 
Childres and Garamella argue that recoveries like that awarded in Boomer v. Muir are incorrect 
because, inter a/ia, such fact patterns merely present versions of reliance damages, which should 
be dealt with by reference to the contract terms. 
154. In perceiving a need to avoid imposing a net ltarm on defendants in unjust enrichment 
cases, courts seem to draw a distinction between persons who have passively come.into posses-
sion of something belonging to another, and those persons who have taken an active role to 
direct the contested benefit by themselves. Cf. supra note 150 (stating that our position is not 
dependent on the "bad man" view of contract breach). 
An innocently passive defendant wlto has received the benefit of a stranger's services with-
out request generally will be liable for no more than "the amount by which tlte recipient or his 
property ltas benefitted." REsrATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, QUASI CoNTRACI'S AND CoNSTRUC. 
TIVE TRUSTS § 155 Cint d (1937) [ltereinafter REsrATEMENT OF REsmunoN]. Similarly, when 
a trespasser adds extraordinary value and has not committed the trespass intentionally, the 
owner can claim only the value of the materials taken but is not entitled either to tlte thing taken 
or its increased value. See AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY§ 19.9 (A. James Casner ed., 1952). 
Persons who violate the rights of others, particularly if they do so knowingly, may be treated 
quite differently. See, e.g., id. §. 129(3) cmt. d, illus. 5 (where a trespasser takes shrubs, knowing 
they are not I.tis, and doubles their value tbrouglt his gardening efforts, tlte plaintiff is entitled to 
their value as improved, thus granting plaintiff the advantage of defendant's efforts). Fiduciaries 
wlto violate their trust, for example, may be required to disgorge all pro~ts, including those that 
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passively finds himself enriched; a court might be reluctant to force 
this overpaid creditor to disgorge the benefit if he would suffer a net 
harm by being required to return it.155 But in our cases, the defendant 
has committed a breach of contract; he is not innocent or passive. 
And where a defendant is not a passive innocent, the courts will be 
less concerned with protecting his autonomy from any possible 
harm.156 Similarly, Professor Birks believes that with "free accept-
ance," a defendant forfeits his right to complain that the restitutionary 
remedy costs him more than his subjective valuation of the benefit 
received. · 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, objections premised upon 
the nature of restitution fundamentally mistake the concerns that 
uniquely demark that doctrinal area's sphere of dominance. The 
proper triggering event for the various doctrines known as restitution-
ary is the presence of some positive value that defendant has reaped 
(or has sought to reap) as a result of plaintiff's efforts. The presence 
of such positive effects requires use of a distinct approach, which our 
law largely groups under the title restitution.157 However, the mea-
sure of recovery need not be limited to the triggering event.158 
result not from the plaintiff's resources but from the fiduciary's own entrepreneurial ability. See 
1 GEORGE E, PALMER, THE LAw OF REsnnmoN § 2.11 (1978). A trustee may be held 
"accountable for the profits made by his employees even though he receiyed none of the profit." 
Id. § 2.11, at 142. 
Sometimes even in the case of passive defendants, the court will impose a recovery in excess 
of the benefit the defendant had received. See, e.g., REsTATEMENT OF REsnnmoN § 1 cmt. e 
(1937) (stating that the estate of an accident victim wqo is assisted skillfully, but fruitlessly, by a 
medical professional during an emergency must pay regardless of the fact that the defeudant was 
not "enriched thereby"); see id. § 155 cmt. d. There is enough flexibility in the term "benefit," 
however, to make any such inquiry ambiguous. · 
155. Thus, a defendant who receives property by mistake probably need not pay if the prop-
erty is lost before the mistake is discovered. DAN DOBBS, HoRNBOOK ON THE LAW OF REME-
DIES. § 4.6, at 280-81 (1973). 
156. See Gordon, supra note 26, at 199 n.193. 
157. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution and Intellectual 
Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449 (1992) (exploring the different rules that should apply when 
positive as compared with negative externalities are at issue); Donald Wittman, Liability for 
Harm or Restitution for Benefit?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 57 (1984) (same). 
158. For a brief discussion of this controversial issue, see Laycock, supra note 123. 
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IX. UNJUST ENRICHMENT, DEFAULT RULES, RELIANCE, 
AND EXPECTATION: UNITED BUT 
DISTINGUISHED THEY STAND 
Whether one classifies cases like Boomer v. Muir as restitution, as 
reliance, or as expectation, the result should be the same:159 In cases 
of ostensibly-but-not:.truly-losing contracts where the supplier par-
tially performs, a recovery should be appropriately keyed to what the 
supplier has provided-rather than to what the defendant has 
received or the contract states as its price. We hope we have proved 
the substantive appropriateness of our approach. · In this section, we 
also suggest that our rule can be consistent with the concerns underly-
ing various classifications' approaches, even though those other classi-
fications may be encrusted with subrules that inhibit their reaching a 
Muir-type recovery. 
A. OVERLAP 
The majority rule's restitution measure both reflects what the 
plaintiff expended in reliance and can indicate that the plaintiff 
expected to receive at least that ·much in benefit from the contract. 
Just as reliance is sometimes said to be the best measure of expecta-
tion,160 in some contexts restitution may serve as the best measure of 
both reliance and expectation.161 In part for that very reason, our rule 
well represents the most plausible default rule.162 
159. Thus, for example, Childres and Garamella would classify Boomer v. Muir as a reliance 
case, and they criticize its result on that account Childres & Garamella, supra note 150, at 448. 
We think the case is mischaracterized as simply a matter of reliance, since the monies spent by 
plaintiff were spent for the benefit of the defendant. Yet even Childres and Garamella, who 
would place the case solely within the reliance camp, recognize that the most important issue is 
not classification but result. Id. at 438. 
160. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 26. 
161. For further discussion, see supra Part II.D. 
162. We are assuming here an approach to default rules that seeks to emulate what the 
parties would have chosen. Cf. David Chamy, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure 
of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. RE.v. 1815 {1991) (evaluating the approach which asks, 
"what would the parties have agreed to had they explicitly averted to the issue?"). In some 
contexts different approaches to default rules should be used; thus, for example, it is suggested in 
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Complete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. FJl (1989), that parties should sometimes be penalized for failing to 
fill in their terms-but our case is not one of those where a "penalty" approach should be 
employed. As previously explored, we think the cost of the parties' specifying the terms of all 
non-price benefits-including the cost inherent in possibly eroding the trust on which necessary 
. reciprocity may rest-is far higher than the cost of judicial administration to determine these 
terms. See supra part VII.D.2. This notion is discussed further infra Part IX.B. 
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Thus, if the parties had thought to discuss the issue, the supplier 
might have said, "I'll give you goods and services at a below-market 
price because I put a value on the contract for reasons [ab c], which 
make the contract worth more to me than just the money you'll pay 
me under it. If you don't follow through, however, that means I'll lose 
[x y z], as well as whatever I've spent or forgone in performing the 
contract for you.163 If that happens, at least you should reimburse my 
costs. (I'll even concede that if for some reason my costs are higher 
than the market value of the goods and services I provided, you 
should pay me only the market value.164) This proposal of mine seems 
fair, since you're getting such a price break, and since this eventuality 
only comes up if you breach, and since even then I'd only be asking 
you to pay for what you receive." In all likelihood, the defendant 
would agree-after all, he expects to get below-market goods and 
services, and at time of inception has no plans to cancel. 
B. Is R.EsnTUTION NECESSARY? 
Even someone who agreed with the foregoing might contend that 
our rule is unnecessary-that the cases we discuss in this Comment 
are those in which the courts would award expectation or reliance 
damages, so that restitution would be superfluous. We disagree. The 
cases we discuss-of ostensibly but not-truly-losing contracts-are 
not insignificant in number and scale, yet they are likely to fall outside 
the kind of expectations and reliance that courts traditionally enforce. 
Reliance damages in excess of contract price are unlikely to cover 
cases such as Muir because such damages are usually awarded when 
the plaintiff expended funds outside his contract obligations in reliance 
on the future performance of the contract by the defendant.165 A 
large part of the reason for this rule, which prohibits recovery for 
"essential" expenditures under a reliance theory, is a fear of double 
163. The necessary implication is: I value [x y z] more than I value the difference between 
the market price (or my cost) and the contract price. 
164. Recall that under our rule, a plaintiff who spends wastefully on partial performance will 
not be able to collect full reimbursement for costs: If the defendant can prove those costs were 
above the market value of what the plaintiff provided, the court would require the defendant to 
pay only market value. See supra part 11.C (our rule); see also supra part VI.E (discussing reme-
dial measures). 
165. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 26, at 78-79 (discussing essential versus incidental reli-
ance). Further, it is doubtful that a supplier's opportunity cost would be compensated for under 
a reliance theory. Id. at 82. 
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recovery: The plaintiff's costs of contract completion are already cal-
culated into the lost profits the plaintiff can obtain under an "expecta-
tion" measure.166 In our situation, there is no danger of double 
recovery unless expectation damages are significantly broadened, 167 
yet the way the reliance formulae are usually stated would make reli-
ance damages d@q-plt to· obtain.1~8. 
Expectation damages are alsQ unlikely to cover our type of cases, 
because non-price benefits are hard to prove under prevailing require-
ments of foreseeability apd ce~ainty. Over the. last several years, 
American courts have si~cantly lowered the threshold of proof 
required ~o estab4sh the intangible or future benefits of a contract.169 
In some cases, courts require parties to show the other party's liability 
by a preponc,terance of the evidence but lessened the standard 
for establishing the extent of damages.17° Following this general shift, 
courts in vario'!-ls jurisdictions have considered claims for loss of good-
will, 171 damage to reputation,172 lost profits after part performance,173 
166. See, e.g., Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 546 {1903). 
167. See infra text accompanying notes 179-81. · 
168. Some courts do, admittedly, give "essential reliance" damages where expectation meas-
ures are unavailable. 
169: FARNSWORTH, supra note 51, § 12.15. 
170. See Massman Constr. Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 769 F.2d 1114, 1122 (E.D. Tenn. 
1985) (citing Locke v. United States, 283 F.2d 521 {Ct. Cl. 1955) ("If the reasonable probability 
of damage can be clearly estaJ?lished, uncertainty as tq the amount will not preclu~e recov-
ery.")). Professor Farnsworth describes this as the "extreme view." FARNSWORTII, supra note 
51, § 12.15. . . . - . 
171. See Westric Battery Co. v. Standard Elec. Co., 522 F.2d 986, 987 {10th Cir. 1975). Some 
states categqrically deny damages for loss of goodwill. See Argo Welded Prods. v. J.T. Ryerson 
Steel & Sons, 528 F. Supp. 583, 588 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
172. Indiana & Mich. Elec. v. Turre Haute Indus., 507 N.E.2d 588, 606-07 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1987) {denying recovery because the quantification of damages was "wholly conjectural" and no 
relevant authority supported recovery for "loss of face" due to a breach of contract); see also 
Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442, 1448 {7th Cir. 1992) {allowing recovery for lost 
profits on future contracts but denying recovery for damage to reputation); Redgrave v. Boston 
Symphony Orchestra, 855 F.2d 888, 893-94 {1st Cir.1988) (en bane) (denying recovery for dam-
age to reputation for failure to show specific lost opportunities), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1043 
(1989). 
173.- Terre Haute Indus., 507 N.E.2d at 601-02 {allowing recovery of lost profits after an 
owner discharged a contractor prior to the completion of their contract). · Given sufficient evi-
dence, courts can easily calculate the present value of lost future profits. See Walgreen Co. v. 
Sara Creek Property Co., 966 F~d 273, 274-75 (7th Cir. 1992). Courts have also been willing to 
award the value of a "chance." See Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24, 29 {Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1990); Anderson v. Gailey, 606 P.2d 93 {Idaho 1980) (stating that even though determining 
the value of a chance is difficult, "the difficulty of the task does not warrant the abandonment of 
the duty"). The value of a chance is the likelihood of the profits occurring multiplied by their 
present value. 
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lost future profits,174 lost opportunities,175 ~d opportunity costs.176 
Non-price benefits can include just such factors.177 
Nevertheless, despite the loosening of the requirements of fore-
seeability and certainty, in many cases in which parties claim intangi-
ble and future benefits flowing from the existence or completion of a 
contract, courts still deny recovery.178 An expectation measure of 
damages is therefore unlikely to capture many of the Muir-type cases 
where non-price benefits are anticipated. 
But should expectation damages be broadened to do so? Argua-
bly, some recent cases have awarded damages for what traditionally 
would be considered speculative expectations. If this trend continues, 
then perhaps plaintiffs in cases such as Muir could be awarded the 
equivalent of restitutionary relief under the heading of expectation 
damages covering the plaintiffs' non-price benefits. 
Assuming one is persuaded of our overall approach, which is the 
better remedial form? Maintaining the restitutionary remedies, or 
extending expectation remedies to include traditionally restitutionary 
remedies and limiting restitution as a contract remedy to the old com-
mon law boundaries?179 
It may be desirable to move restitutionary remedies to rest under 
the expectation umbrella in order to streamline and simplify the cate-
gories of contract remedies. But, blending expectation damages with 
our type of case would arguably overcompensate plaintiffs and 
increase administrative costs. A plaintiff like the subcontractor in· 
Muir should not receive compensation for his non-price expectations 
174. Dallman Co. v. Southern Heater Co., 68 Cal. Rptr. 873, 878-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) 
(allowing recovery for projected profits from contracts with third parties).' 
175. Air Technology Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 199 N.E.2d 538, 548 (Mass. 1962) (allowing 
recovery). 
176. Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1369-70 (7th Cir. 
1985) (denying recovery and noting that the law had not "evolved to the point where every time 
a buyer breaks a contract, the seller is entitled to the time value of money"). 
177. In Paul Hardeman, Inc. v. Arkansas Poiyer & Light, the plaintiff was a new and growing 
business. In their discussion of the bid, a "losing contract" according to their figures, the defend-
ants speculated that perhaps Hardeman had submitted a low bid in order to gain entry into the 
power transmission field. 380 F. Supp. 298, 309 (E.D. Ark. 1974). Furthermore, the court notes 
that the plaintiff's cost of performance was higher because it was forced to learn on the job. Id. 
at 311. 
178. See, e.g., Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Measure and Elements of Damages for Breach 
of Contract to Lend Money, 4 A.L.R.4th 682, 719-20 (Supp. 1994); supra notes 164-65 and 
accompanying text. 
179. We assume that Professor Kull will both object to the extension of expectation reme-
dies and advocate the limitation of restitution. 
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unless he provided significantly discounted supplies. Such supplies, 
whether of goods or services, both demonstrate the existence of 
expectations, 180 and, perhaps more importantly, shift the balance of 
the equities. Expectations in the absence of benefits transferred to 
defendant should be handled under traditional expectation rules, with 
their constraints regardfug speculativeness and certainty. 
Reducing or eliminating the coverage of restitutionary equitable 
remedies, further, may blur the flavors of, and differences between, 
the remedies. Contract remedies may become more explicitly discre-
tionary181 and restitutionary remedies may become more limited by 
reference to the contract. Whether these changes are desirable is an 
important question, which we leave for another day. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Our departure point, as our starting point, is the issue raised in 
the Muir case: Should a supplier of goods and services at below-mar-
ket price be awarded, upon breach by the other party, restitutionary 
relief-actual cost or market price far exceeding the contract price? 
No, says Professor Kull. The supplier should receive "what he bar-
gained for"-the contract price. We agree that the supplier should 
receive what he bargained for. We disagree that what he bargained 
for is the contract price. We do not presume that the supplier is fool-
ish but rather that he prqvided a discount in order to obtain non-price 
benefits from the contract completion, for example, enhanced reputa-
tion or reciprocal treatment from the other party. If the other party 
agreed to receive the discounted price and had notice of the supplier's 
expectations, that party should be permitted to take advantage of the 
discount without meeting the expectation if and only if the party per-
forms its part of the bargain. If that party breaches the contract, the 
discount-which was premised upon the promise of contract comple-
tion-should no longer be available to it. Under the Muir majority 
180. The plaintiff has put his money where his mouth is: The plaintiff incurred costs, and in 
many cases substantial costs, in exchange for a chance to gain the non-price benefits. Such cases 
constitute a sufficiently distinct and narrow group that they would not open the floodgates to 
litigation. In addition, the courts' costs of determining the value of the plaintiffs' expectations 
are minimized by following the plaintiffs' expenditures. These expenditures are likely to provide 
the courts a reliable guide to assess the value of the plaintiffs' expectations. For an alternative 
view see Levmore, supra note 92. For these reasons judicial determination of restitutionary rem-
edies involves relatively modest increases in administrative costs, as compared to other reme-
dies, such as expectation and reliance damages. 
181. For an introduction to the many ways in which contract damage remedies already 
reflect judicial discretion, see Laycock, supra note 123. 
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rule, accordingly, the supplier has the option of rescinding the con-
tract and demanding the full market price (or costs) for the goods and 
services supplied. 
Under traditional contract law plaintiffs such as the subcontractor 
in the Muir case cannot claim expectation-based or reliance-based 
compensation because their expectations are too speculative. If con-
tract law expands expectation remedies to include non-price benefits 
of the kind examined here, then perhaps restitutionary remedies could 
be subsumed under that category of remedies. Whether such a move 
is desirable is a matter we leave for another day. Until such time, 
however, restitutionary remedies should be maintained, or, better yet, 
a rule such as ours should be adopted, distinguishing between genu-
inely losing and ostensibly losing contracts. In both events, plaintiffs 
such as the subcontractor in Boomer v. Muir should be compensated 
for the non-price benefits that motivated their contractual behavior. 

